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FINANCE AND GROWTH: THE LEGAL AND
REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
ROLE OF THE PUBLIC EQUITY
MARKET IN THE UNITED STATES
Ezra Wasserman Mitchell*
The important study of the relationship between finance and economic
growth has exploded over the past two decades.  One of the most signifi-
cant open questions is the role of the public equity market in stimulating
growth and the channels it follows if it does.  This paper examines that
question from an economic, legal, and historical perspective, especially
with regard to its regulatory and corporate governance implications.  The
US market is my focus.
In contrast to most studies, I follow both economic history and the ac-
tual flow of funds in addition to empirics and theory to conclude that the
public equity market’s contribution to US economic growth is highly lim-
ited to the small but important contemporary role it plays in providing exit
opportunities for entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.  Nevertheless, there
is a serious question as to the real economic growth benefit of easy exit.  In
particular, exit by merger may well be more macro-economically efficient
than exit by IPO.
I further tentatively conclude that the modern behavior of the US public
equity market may be damaging to the long-term sustainability of Ameri-
can corporate capitalism and to long-term social welfare – in particular the
market’s significant role in increasing economic inequality.  Thus an over-
all appraisal of the market’s benefits and costs in the broader context of
economic growth and economic inequality is long overdue.  Important
questions for corporate governance, financial regulation, and the structure
of market institutions are raised.  Along the way, I will have reason to
question the continuing viability of the Miller-Modigliani irrelevance
theorem.
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What is the contribution of the public equity market to US economic
growth?  Resolution of this question has important implications for how
we regulate securities markets, financial markets more broadly, and even
corporate governance.  If public equity markets stimulate growth in a
meaningful way, the kind of serious market regulation and shareholder-
oriented corporate governance we currently employ may be suitable.  But,
if public equity markets play a limited role in financing corporate
productivity, we might conclude that the manner in which we currently
regulate is far too costly, and that regulatory resources might be better
used if redirected to more productive financial sectors—or even saved.
We might also conclude that corporate and securities laws inappropriately
privilege the interests of public equity holders in a manner that negatively
affects economic growth.  Underlying this analysis is the critical question
of whether we should diminish the role of public equity markets in order
to protect the functioning of capitalism.
My principal conclusion is that the primary role of the US public equity
market is to stimulate business formation by providing IPO exit for early
investors.  As a historical matter, however, that function is quite recent
and remains quite limited—recent arguments for its importance are
therefore overstated.  More importantly, evidence exists to suggest that
easy IPO exit may not be entirely beneficial and that there is good reason
to think that exit by merger provides a greater contribution to long-term
economic growth.
There are also deeper structural issues for lawyers to address.  If the
public equity market makes only a limited contribution to American
industrial production, perhaps it is time to rethink the manner in which we
regulate the issuance, sale, and trading of securities.  I will argue that most
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public equities serve as financial commodities rather than financing
instruments, but without the ultimate use value of real commodities.  And
I will further argue that economic theory itself demonstrates that the risk-
allocation functions of the market only allocate risks that would not exist
in the absence of a public equity market.  This would obviously be
unobjectionable if the public equity market provided strong growth
benefits.  But it does not.  The market exists for the sake of the market.
I tentatively conclude that the modern behavior of the US public
equity market may be damaging to the long-term sustainability of
American capitalism and the long-term welfare of Americans.  The
implication is that we need to focus our intellectual and regulatory
resources on those aspects of the market that do serve to finance long-
term economic growth.  In other words, we must diminish the role of the
public equity markets in order to protect the long-term functioning of
capitalism itself.
This paper proceeds as follows.  Part I presents a summary review of
the literature on the nexus between financial development and economic
growth in an effort to isolate the growth-related functions of public equity
markets.  Part II presents a more in-depth examination of the purported
economic growth-creating functions of public equity markets.  Part III
dives deeper into the strongest of the arguments supporting a nexus
between public equity markets and economic growth, evaluating their
strengths.  Part IV adds insights from economic history and
microeconomic financial analysis to explore the relationship between the
microeconomic and macroeconomic evaluations of the market’s role.  The
principal focus of this section is on entrepreneurial finance, the main
channel through which it appears that the public equity market provides
its most useful function.  Related questions center on the substitutability
of debt for equity and relationships among the public equity market,
corporate finance, and managerial behavior.  Part V concludes.
I. BACKGROUND
In the words of two prominent scholars, “[t]he influence of financial
development on economic growth . . . is now a firmly established part of
the economics canon.”1  While this literature frequently is dated to 1911,
significant interest in the subject has grown only over the last twenty-five
years and is itself largely ahistorical.  While much of the effort focuses on
developing countries, attention also has been paid to developed
economies.2
1. Peter L. Rousseau & Paul Wachtel, Economic Growth and Financial Depth: Is the
Relationship Extinct Already? 1-2 (NYU Working Paper No. 2451/26108, 2008) http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1282539.
2. For excellent surveys and analyses of this literature, see generally Ross Levine,
Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda, 35 J. ECON.  LIT. 688
(1997) [hereinafter, Levine, Financial Development]; Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: The-
ories and Evidence. in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, VOLUME 1A, 865-934 (Philippe
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There is significant debate over the circumstances under, and the ex-
tent to which, financial development stimulates economic growth.3  Much
of the work has centered on banks,4 although attention also has been paid
to the relationship between stock market development and economic
growth5 where the evidence is most ambiguous,6 with one of the weakest
Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf, eds.; 2005) [hereinafter Levine, Finance and Growth]; Peter
L. Rousseau, Share Liquidity and Industrial Growth in an Emerging Market: The Case of New
England, 1854-1897. NBER Working Paper No. H0117 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=225069 (1999); Peter L., Rousseau & Richard Sylla, Emerging Financial
Markets and Early U.S. Industrial Growth, NBER Working Paper No. W7448 (2001) http://pa
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=191548; Raghuram G. Rajan, & Luigi Zingales,
Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 559 (1998).
3. There is also a significant methodological debate within economics, with empirical
studies beginning to shift from cross-country regressions to time-series analysis in the late
1990s, with advocates of the latter arguing, in part, that cross-country studies obliterate much
of importance in particular national situations. See e.g. Philip Arestis, Panicos Demetriades,
&  Kul B. Luintel, Financial Development and Economic Growth: The Role of Stock Markets,
33 J. MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING at 17, n.3 (2001) [hereinafter, Arestis et al., Financial
Development and Economic Growth].
4. James B. Ang, A Survey of Recent Developments in the Literature of Finance and
Growth. 22 J. ECON. SURVEYS 536, 568 (2008). But see Levine, Finance and Growth, supra
note 2, at 714 (claiming that the literature is focused too greatly on equity markets); see also
Robert G. King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter May Be Right, 108 Q. J.
ECON. , at 717 (1993).
5. See e.g. Raymond Atje & Boyan Jovanovic, Stock Markets and Development, 37
EURO. ECON. REV. 632 (1993) (arguing that stock market development drives growth); see
also Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Market Development and Long-Run Growth, 10
World Bank Economic Review 323 (1996) (to the same effect). But see Philip Arestis, &
Panicos Demetriades, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Assessing the Evidence.
107 ECON. J. 783, 790 (1997) (noting insufficient evidence to establish that financial develop-
ment causes real GDP growth in the United States); see also Arestis et al., Financial Develop-
ment and Economic Growth, supra note 3, at 16, (arguing that empirical evidence on the role
of stock markets is weak and that while developed banks and stock markets both correlate
with economic growth, banks show a much stronger correlation and that the evidence with
respect to stock markets is overstated); see also Richard F. D. Harris, Stock Markets and
Development: A Re-Assessment, 41 EURO. ECON. REV. 139 (1997) (arguing that stock mar-
ket-growth nexus is weak).
6. See Philip Arestis & Panicos Demetriades, Financial Development and Economic
Growth: Assessing the Evidence. 107 ECON. J. 783 (1997); see also, generally Arestis et al.,
Financial Development and Economic Growth, supra note 3, (arguing that empirical evidence
on the role of stock markets is weak and that while developed banks and stock markets both
correlate with economic growth, banks show a much stronger correlation and that the evi-
dence with respect to stock markets is overstated); see also, generally, Harris, supra note 5;
Gerard Caprio, Jr., & Asli Demirguc-Kunt, The Role of Long-Term Finance: Theory and
Evidence, 13 THE WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER, at 171 (1998) (noting note that “the
effect of stock market development on firms’ financing decisions is theoretically inconclu-
sive,” and little empirical evidence exists); Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, Stock Markets,
Banks, and Growth: Panel Evidence, 28 J. BANKING & FIN., at 28 (2004) (concluding that
their data show both banks and stock markets as important for industrial growth, although
they concede that conclusions as to which are more important are debatable); see also, Asli
Demirguc-Kunt & Ross Levine, Stock Market Development and Financial Intermediaries:
Stylized Facts, 10 World Bank Economic Review 291, 293-4 (1996); Peter Haas, and Gerhard
Fink, The Finance-Growth-Nexus Revisited: New Evidence and the Need for Broadening the
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bodies of empirical evidence dealing with the relationship between the
stock market, corporate governance, and economic growth.7 The most
plausible conclusion is that developed stock markets encourage economic
growth by providing liquidity for investors.  This appears to be correct.
But, as is typically the case, the devil is in the details.
It makes sense to begin with a look at the ways in which financial de-
velopment is believed to affect economic growth, taking Levine’s “tenta-
tive observations” as among the best conclusions available at the
moment.8  Those conclusions are that “countries with better functioning
banks and markets grow faster, but that the degree to which a country is
bank-based or market-based does not matter much” and that “better func-
tioning financial systems ease the external financing constraints that im-
peded firm and industrial expansion.”9
Several different theoretical approaches have been used to evaluate
the “finance-growth nexus.”10  I will concentrate on what Levine refers to
as the “functional approach,” which appears to fit best an analysis of the
purposes of the market, corporate governance and financial regulation.11
This approach identifies five major functions of financial markets that may
explain the correlation of financial development with economic growth:
(1) providing mechanisms for risk-sharing; (2) facilitating resource alloca-
tion; (3) providing mechanisms for asserting corporate control and moni-
Approach (EI Working Paper No. 73, 2003), http://fgr.wu-wien.ac.at/institut/ef/publicat.html
(criticizing previous work, particularly with methodology applied to developing countries,
and noting that positive stock market effects have been shown for the U.S. economy).
7. Levine, Finance and Growth, supra note 2, at 874; but see Randall K Morck &
Lloyd Steier, The Global History of Corporate Governance: An Introduction at 40 (NBER
Working Paper No. W11062, 2005), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=652361 (concluding that “[f]inancial development seems intimately tied to corporate gov-
ernance,” but acknowledging the ambiguity of the evidence); see also Gerard Caprio, Jr. &
Ross Levine, Corporate Governance in Finance: Concepts and International Observations, in
FINANCIAL SECTOR GOVERNANCE: THE ROLES OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS, pp. 17-47
(Robert E. Litan, Michael Pomerleano, and V. Sunderajan, eds., 2002) (“Just as corporate
governance influences the efficiency of firm production at the corporate level, so does the
effectiveness of a nation’s corporate governance system shape economic performance at the
country level.”).
8. Levine, Finance and Growth, supra note 2, at 868; see generally Ang, supra note 4
(providing an excellent literature review, including sophisticated critiques of the empirical
methodologies used and suggestions for improved analysis).
9. Levine, Finance and Growth, supra note 2, at 868. It should be readily apparent
that accepting these conclusions determines nothing about the benefits either of stock mar-
kets or shareholder rights, especially in light of Levine’s own assertion that the distinction
between a bank-based system and a market-based system appears irrelevant and other evi-
dence that banks are more closely correlated with growth than equity markets.
10. The empirical approaches have included “broad cross-country growth regressions,
times-series analyses, panel techniques, detailed country studies, and a recent movement that
uses more microeconomic-based methodologies,” Levine, Finance and Growth, supra note 2,
at 868.
11. See Levine, Financial Development, supra note 2, at 689. Ang also employs the
functional approach. See generally Ang, supra note 4.
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toring managers; (4) pooling and deploying savings; and (5) providing
mechanisms for the exchange of goods and services.12  Levine identifies
“two channels” through which each of these financial functions might af-
fect economic growth: capital accumulation and technological
innovation.13
Despite Levine’s five-part classification, it appears that the principal
growth-related functions of financial markets generally boil down to the
reduction of information and transaction costs.  Other benefits are either
subsidiary or closely related to those two functions.  A broad public stock
market is not necessary to reduce information and transaction costs, nor is
a system of corporate governance that permits shareholders to exercise
what are generally described as ownership rights.  Perhaps most notably,
the case for the stock market’s role in capital accumulation in the indus-
trial sector is weak.  The case for technological innovation is somewhat
stronger, but the mechanisms of stimulating technological innovation are
debatable.
II. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STOCK MARKET
Public equity markets can be seen as having four main functions in the
economy.  First, financial markets facilitate risk sharing.  Second, financial
intermediaries allocate capital among potential investments.  Third, stock-
holders monitor corporate performance and motivate the market for cor-
porate control.  Fourth, and finally, financial institutions mobilize savings
to fund investments.  Each of these functions is used as theoretical support
for the nexus between public equity markets and economic growth.  In this
Part, I will discuss each of these functions.  Part III, however, will only
focus on the first two functions, which I believe are the strongest evidence
that public markets fuel economic growth and in fact encompass many of
the important elements of the latter two functions.  Moving forward, I will
refer to the work presenting and supporting these arguments as the “fi-
nance-growth literature.”
A. Financial Markets Facilitate Risk Sharing
 The first function of public equity markets deals with investors’ ability to
diversify and pool resources to invest in companies in a stock market.
Capital investment entails information and transactions costs, which in
turn present two types of risk: liquidity risk and “idiosyncratic risk.”14 Li-
quidity risk, which generalizes over all investments, entails the possibility
that an investor will be stuck with an undesirable investment.  Idiosyn-
cratic risk relates to investment in particular projects.  Information asym-
metries may be sufficiently great as to preclude most potential investors
12. Levine, Financial Development, supra note 2, at 691.
13. Id; Ang, supra note 4, at 538 (describing these channels as “the capital accumula-
tion channel and the total factor productivity . . . channel.”).
14. Levine, Financial Development, supra note 2, at 691.
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from undertaking an investment in a particular enterprise with a sufficient
degree of confidence to commit to a long-term position in that enterprise.
Transaction costs may be sufficiently high as to entail excessive sunk costs
in making the investment or burdening exit from the investment with ex-
penses that discourage investing in the first place.  To the extent investing
takes place in this environment, it will likely be in low-risk, low-return
enterprises, thus stifling innovation and making saving rather than invest-
ment an attractive option.15
The emergence of financial markets ameliorates this problem by en-
hancing liquidity, thus encouraging savers to invest in higher-risk projects,
with greater information provided by the market and the comfort of
knowing that relatively low-cost exit is available, at the same time provid-
ing firms with the ability to obtain permanent capital for long-term invest-
ment.  Moreover, by making diversification easier, financial markets may
encourage savers to transform their savings into investments, providing
lower risk but a sufficiently attractive overall return to make investment
rational.16  The effect of diminished liquidity risk may, it is argued, facili-
tate capital accumulation and encourage technological innovation, thus
leading to economic growth.17
In reviewing the finance-growth literature, Levine notes that banks are
fully capable of aggregating savings and deploying them in a diversified
manner, with a mix of low-risk, low-return investments and more equity-
like high-risk, high-return investments, while resolving information
problems and providing liquidity to small investors.18  Nonetheless, some
scholars suggest that the presence of liquid equity markets diminishes the
competitiveness of banks in performing this function, and thus liquid eq-
uity markets will come to dominate banks in ameliorating liquidity risk.19
But, it is clear that both financial intermediaries and stock markets can
perform the risk reduction function of information accumulation and
transmission that helps to diminish liquidity risk.20
15. Id. at 692.
16. See id. at 693. The effect of excess savings over investment is a long-standing one.
See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW FINANCE TRIUMPHED
OVER INDUSTRY 99 (2007) (describing early 20th century American views on the stagnation
of the French economy) [hereinafter, MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY].
17. Levine, Financial Development, supra note 2, at 693.
18. NAOMI LAMOREAUX, INSIDER LENDING: BANKS, PERSONAL CONNECTIONS, AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDUSTRIAL NEW ENGLAND, at 82 (1994); Levine, Financial
Development, supra note 2, at 693-4.
19. Levine, Financial Development, supra note 2, at 694; see also Asli Demirguc-Kunt
& Vojislav Maksimovic, Stock Market Development and Financing Choices of Firms, 10
WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 341, 316 (1996).
20. Levine, Financial Development, supra note 2, at 695; see also Ang, supra note 4, at
549 (noting absence of empirical evidence to support the superiority of either the bank-based
or market-based view of the finance-growth nexus); R.D.F. Harris, Stock Markets and Devel-
opment: A Re-Assessment, 41 EUR. ECON. REV. 139, 140 (concluding that stock market activ-
ity has only a weak effect on growth); Beck & Levine, supra, note 6, at 719-20 (concluding
that banks and stock markets stimulate growth but conceding that their evidence could be
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Thus while it appears that financial institutions generally contribute to
economic development by overcoming problems of information asymme-
try in a manner that enhances investor liquidity, the stock market’s contri-
bution to the performance of this function is ambiguous.  It appears that
this function may also be performed well by other types of financial in-
termediaries without some of the distortions created by equity markets.21
It is premature, however, to dismiss entirely the importance of public eq-
uity in economic development—it is well supported that liquid capital
markets, fueled by access to information, are at least correlative to eco-
nomic growth.22
B. Financial Intermediaries Allocate Capital
The second function of public equity markets, capital allocation, is
tightly tied to its risk sharing function.  In the presence of the informa-
tional problems discussed above, markets might allocate capital inef-
ficiently.23  In a public equity market, financial intermediaries, who may
be especially effective in identifying entrepreneurs who are likely to suc-
ceed, step in.  In 1911 Joseph Schumpeter assigned this function to
banks,24 but, as I will discuss in Part II, venture capital funds appear to
have taken over a large portion of the task since the late 20th century.25
interpreted in a manner that fails to privilege either form of financial institution. But see
Levine & Zervos, supra note 5, at 324-325 (finding evidence from cross-country growth re-
gressions that stock market development correlates with long-run economic growth (the
methodology used in Levine & Zervos is criticized in Beck & Levine)); Demirguc-Kunt &
Levine, supra note 6, at 293 (noting that countries with well-developed stock markets tend to
have well-developed banks).
21. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J.
FIN. 737, 772 (1997) (noting that “a large theoretical and anecdotal literature argues that the
American corporate governance system, particularly takeovers, imposes short horizons on
the behavior of corporate managers, and hence reduces the efficiency of investment”). More
recent empirical work seems to provide some confirmation of the theoretical insight. See, e.g.,
John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey & Shiva Rajgopal, Value Destruction and Financial
Reporting Decisions, 62 FIN. ANALYSTS J., at 27 (2006); John R. Graham, Campbell R. Har-
vey & Shiva Rajgopal, The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40 J.
ACCT. & ECON. , at 3 (2005); Philippe Aghion & Jeremy C. Stein, Growth vs. Margins: Desta-
bilizing Consequences of Giving the Stock Market What it Wants 1, 24-25 (2004), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=631184 (concluding that even in an efficient stock market, managers’ de-
sire to satisfy stock market demands can “introduce significant excess volatility into real vari-
ables such as output and sales”).
22.
23. Levine, Financial Development, supra note 2, at 695.
24. See generally, JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT (1911).
25. I say “appear to” rather than “have” because the proportion of new business fi-
nancing attributable to venture capital is quite small, Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell,
The Economics of Small Business Finance: The Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in
the Financial Growth Cycle, 22 J. BANKING & FIN., at 613-673 (1998) [hereinafter, Berger &
Udell, The Economics of Small Business Finance]. Further, it appears to be concentrated in
discrete regions of the country and discrete business sectors, although the former conclusion
may be due somewhat to limitations in available data. See Paul A. Gompers, Corporations
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It is not the case, however, that well-disseminated good information, or
good information collected by financial intermediaries, necessarily results
in the efficient allocation of capital.  There is significant literature contra-
dicting Levine, suggesting that developed stock markets can hinder eco-
nomic growth by discouraging the search for information,26 discouraging
investment in human capital,27 and distorting managerial incentives
through market mechanisms resulting in a misuse of productive capital.28.
C. Stockholders Monitor Corporate Performance and Motivate the
Market for Corporate Control
This third function of public equity markets deals with the concern that
managers without very substantial equity stakes have incentives to take
advantage of the corporation’s assets for their own benefit or to fail to
diligently perform their work—in other words, they might steal or they
might shirk.29  The specific areas of concern in the legal literature are
board composition, shareholder voting, litigation, and the market for cor-
porate control.
Why do we worry about monitoring in the first place?  The
microeconomic answer is that inadequate or inefficient monitoring leads
to inefficient corporate governance.  But this only leads to a second ques-
tion: what is the real economic role of efficient corporate governance?
The traditional answer is that, in the absence of efficient corporate govern-
ance, agency costs will lead to lower levels of investment (or higher costs
of capital, which may amount to the same thing) and therefore diminished
productivity and job growth, resulting in correspondingly lower levels of
GDP.
This means that the monitoring argument is intimately linked to ques-
tions of capital formation and allocation.  Absent public equity markets,
no monitoring function of this kind is necessary.  If financial institutions in
public equity markets do not perform the capital allocation function dis-
cussed above in a manner that leads to economic growth, monitoring costs
may be being wasted.
and the Financing of Innovation: The Corporate Venturing Experience, Q4 FEDERAL RE-
SERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV., at 11 (2002); Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, The
Venture Capital Revolution, 15 J. ECON. PERSP., at 145,148 (2001); Samuel Kortum, & Josh
Lerner, Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON., at
674 (2000).
26. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Credit Markets and the Control of Capital, 17 J. MONEY, CREDIT,
AND BANKING, at 133 (1985).
27. See generally JEFFREY PFEFFER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE THROUGH PEOPLE:
UNLEASHING THE POWER OF THE WORK FORCE (1994) (arguing that human capital is a
source of success for businesses, but that Wall Street encourages hostility to workers).
28. Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal, supra note 21,
29. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.  FIN. ECON., at 305 (1976) (as a starting point
of the intersection between the financial economic literature on corporate governance and
the legal literature).
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It is worth noting, however, that in the absence of public markets, the
monitoring problem would not necessarily evaporate—the focus would
shift from concern with managers to worries about expropriation from
shareholders by financial intermediaries, or from minority shareholders by
controlling shareholders.  There is a substantial and well-developed litera-
ture on these problems, especially in studies of comparative corporate
governance.30 The subject of monitoring, while important, has been rather
exhaustively studied, and this paper does not intend to contribute further
to that literature.  Suffice it to say that resolution of the issue of capital
formation determines the course that debates over monitoring should
follow.
D. Financial Institutions Mobilize Savings
The fourth and final function of public equity markets is the ability of
well-developed financial institutions to mobilize the savings of dispersed
individuals by aggregating capital for investment.31  Such mobilization
helps to diminish information and transactions costs that might otherwise
create excessive market friction and misallocation of resources.  While in-
formation and transactions costs can be reduced through contracting be-
tween corporations and multiple investors, financial intermediaries can
increase the efficiency with which this is accomplished and help to create
investment vehicles in small enough denominations to permit widespread
participation.32  This may lead to economic growth because it also facili-
tates the allocation of capital to its highest-value users, and in so doing
stimulates innovation and savings by providing higher returns to capital.33
As with other functions, the strength of this role in stimulating economic
growth lies in the actual allocation of capital by financial institutions to
productive enterprise.
Several points should be immediately apparent from this distinct treat-
ment of savings mobilization.  While it can be treated analytically sepa-
rately, it is really nothing more than a variation on the arguments
previously discussed regarding risk pooling, resource allocation and, to
some extent, managerial monitoring or, to put it summarily, the correction
of informational asymmetries and reduction of transactions costs.  Moreo-
30. See generally Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 21, For a concise statement of the
problem, see Jonathan R. Macey, Italian Corporate Governance: One American’s Perspective,
1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 121, 129-37 (1988).
31. Levine, Financial Development, supra note 2, at 698-99; Levine, Finance and
Growth, supra note 2, at 879.
32. Id.
33. This latter point is less clear.  There is debate in the literature on whether, for
example, an active stock market increases or reduces savings.  Levine, in Financial Develop-
ment, does not mention increasing savings as a consequence of mobilization. See generally
Levine, Financial Development, supra note 2. In Finance and Growth, he states the point
without discussion. Levine, Finance and Growth, supra note 2, at 879.  He does note, citing
Bagehot, that such mobilization can increase the rates of return for individual investors on
their savings, and this I take to imply that savings would therefore increase. Id. at 880.
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ver, the argument does not significantly distinguish between equity and
debt, nor could it, at least in the case of the United States, for equity does
not directly finance industry.  The kind of savings mobilization Levine dis-
cusses could be, and in many countries is, accomplished through the use of
financial intermediaries rather than public equity markets.  As an histori-
cal matter, U.S. banks and other financial intermediaries (not to mention
trade creditors and the commercial paper market) have played a vital fi-
nancing role.34
III. DO PUBLIC CAPITAL MARKETS ACTUALLY STIMULATE ECONOMIC
GROWTH?
Having laid out the principal arguments used to connect the develop-
ment of financial markets and institutions to economic growth, I will now
proceed to evaluate more precisely the central arguments that claim that
public equity markets stimulate economic growth—the risk sharing and
the capital allocation arguments.  I will largely ignore the informational
and transactions costs arguments, as they only matter if we conclude that
public equity markets play an important role in capital formation.  I will,
however, take the informational and transactions costs arguments as theo-
retically sound on their own terms for purposes of this discussion.35
Recall from Part I above that easier access to information is very often
used as an argument in favor of public equity markets as drivers of eco-
nomic growth.  The finance-growth literature relies upon indirect results of
financial development, like informational efficiency and improved liquid-
ity, to sustain the link, but this is insufficient.  Nor is it sufficient to link, as
the empirical literature does, industrial growth to the size and volatility of
the stock market.  These are merely proxies for the formation of produc-
tive capital—one really must follow the money.  Doing so leads to the con-
clusion that the public market plays a limited and indirect, although
possibly important, role in financing production.
A. Risk Sharing Arguments
Recall that the finance-growth literature emphasizes the role of finan-
cial institutions in overcoming information asymmetries and facilitating
liquid markets.  The macroeconomic literature connects this to economic
growth by arguing that this function of financial institutions overcomes
barriers to investment and thus helps to create the circumstances under
which broad public investment in productive enterprise occurs.  I do not
intend to challenge this point.  But, its relevance is dependent on questions
of the nature of the risks shared, the answers to which in turn depend
34. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Legitimate Rights of Public Shareholders, 66 WASH.
& LEE L. REV., at 1635 (2010) [hereinafter, Mitchell, Legitimate Rights].
35. As Harris and Raviv concluded in 1991, the study of informational asymmetries
appeared to have reached the point of diminishing returns in the context of explaining corpo-
rate capital structure.  Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Capital Structure and the Informational
Role of Debt, 45 J. FIN. 321, 351 (1990).
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upon the actual results of capital formation.  Thus I will, in this Part, turn
briefly to the microeconomic financial literature to evaluate precisely what
risks are being shared through the acquisition and dissemination of infor-
mation and the existence of liquid markets, saving for my discussion of
capital allocation the issue of whether in fact the public equity market, as
the principal financial institution under investigation, indeed fulfills this
goal.
1. What Kinds of Risk?
Assume that shareholders do, in a meaningful way, take the risk of
failure resulting from poor corporate production and innovation, and that
they choose to do so in part because they have access to information that
permits intelligent decision making with respect to their potential risk and
return and facilitates the transfer of shares among investors.  How do they
assume their risk?
Shareholders assume their risk by purchasing stock, but, well before
the seminal 1934 work of Benjamin Graham and David Dodd, it was
widely acknowledged that the purchase of stock in a single public com-
pany was a poor investment strategy.36  That pre-Graham and Dodd argu-
ment has been refined over time into what is generally known as modern
finance theory.  Portfolio theory (modern finance theory’s first important
contribution) addressed the question of how an investor should maximize
the value of his investment.  Portfolio theory concluded that investors
should achieve a balance between moderating variance and return by cre-
ating an efficient portfolio—that is, one that either provided the highest
return for a given level of variance or the lowest risk for a given return.37
By so doing, each investor could achieve the maximum return for a given
level of risk.  The wisdom of investing in this manner followed as a matter
of course.38
The argument that sustains portfolio theory meshes nicely with the fi-
nance-growth literature’s explanation of the relationship between devel-
oped financial markets and economic growth.  The market’s role in
providing liquidity makes diversification possible, and modern finance the-
ory tells us that diversified investment is, in fact, the only prudent way for
most people to invest.39  So, the diversification function (facilitated by liq-
36. BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND
TECHNIQUE, at 1-21 (6th ed. 2006).
37. Harry Markowitz, Foundations of Portfolio Theory, 46 J. FIN., at 469 (1991); Harry
Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN., at 77 (1952).
38. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public
Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COL. L. REV., at 231 (2008);
John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81
Iowa L. Rev., at 641 (1996).
39. Easterbrook and Fischel also credit limited liability with making diversification
possible. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). A discussion of limited liability is beyond the scope of this
work—my concern here is with financial risk.
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uid financial markets’ abilities to overcome information asymmetries) is
important not only to the market’s effect on economic growth, as the
macroeconomic argument claims,40 but also to the welfare of individual
shareholders, as demonstrated by the microeconomic perspective.
The finance-growth literature seems to neglect this overlap and assume
that risk reduction—or rather risk-sharing—helps to facilitate economic
growth, without paying much attention to the nature of the risks involved.
The microeconomic literature is more careful in categorizing risk.41
The “capital asset pricing model” (CAPM) followed relatively quickly on
the heels of portfolio theory.  CAPM tells us that if stockholders can tem-
per the risk of loss from any particular corporation by diversifying, a cor-
poration must only compensate its shareholders—its risk-bearing
specialists—for taking non-diversifiable risks.42  Non-diversifiable risks
are those that exist in the market itself, like risks of inflation, market bub-
bles, major political events, the impact of economic cycles, the unavailabil-
ity of credit, and the like.
But, notice the paradox.  If the only risk for which corporations must
(and therefore will) compensate public shareholders is the risk inherent in
the market, then the only risks in which those shareholders are specialists
are market risks.  In the absence of a stock market—or, to put it differ-
ently, in an economy based largely on the provision of external financing
by financial intermediaries—intermediaries would demand compensation
for the risk of loss inherent in specific corporate investments.  While re-
turns from systematic risk would still exist, they would be amplified by
significant idiosyncratic risk (corporate-specific returns).  Indeed, it is
likely that systematic risk would be diminished by eliminating the market
irrationalities inherent in stock market reactions to some categories of sys-
tematic events.43  There would, in other words, be little need for the risk
40. Levine, Finance and Growth, supra note 2, at 875-6.
41. This statement is a bit unfair. Work in the development literature recognizes, in
addition to financial risk, legal risks, political risks, and the like. But insofar as financial risk
is concerned, the statement in the text seems clearly correct.
42. William Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Con-
ditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN., at 425 (1964).  It is commonly said that diversification “eliminates”
the risk of holding stock in a particular corporation.  This is obviously incorrect.  If you own
the stock of corporation A in your portfolio and A goes bankrupt, you have lost your invest-
ment in A.  It is more accurate to say that the impact of that loss on your overall portfolio is
balanced by potential gains in the stock of other corporations you own.
43. The question is one of collective versus individual rational behavior.  While it is
clear, as the current economic crisis demonstrates, that financial institutions collectively can
behave irrationally, at least in the context of a broad derivatives market, it is much more
likely that lending institutions and private equity funds who have contractual and close rela-
tionships with their portfolio companies act individually rationally and, for the most part,
collectively rationally. The public stock market is an entirely different matter.  Noise trading,
for one, which characterizes some portion of the public equity markets doesn’t affect the
financing activities of financial institutions nor does it importantly affect the debt market. See
Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, Or Gambling? Derivative Securities
and Financial Futures and Their Effect on Capital Markets, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 987, 993
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specialization services provided by shareholders, which is to assume sys-
tematic risk.
In other words, the logic of finance theory seems to lead to the circular
conclusion that the only risks in which shareholders specialize are the risks
that they themselves, aggregated in the institution of the market, create, as
it is they—and not banks or public debt holders—who are uniquely depen-
dent upon CAPM’s beta, a measure of systemic risk, for their returns.44
Consequently, the risk-specialization role of public shareholders, and thus
the importance of the stock market, seems harder to justify.  The logic of
risk-specialization is a consequence of the existence of the market, not a
justification for it.
Now I confess that this reasoning moves a bit too quickly.  Despite the
claims made on behalf of portfolio theory, stockholders do buy stock in
specific companies and do take the risk of holding stock in specific compa-
nies—no matter the facility with which they can diversify in order to mini-
mize that risk.  In the absence of a market that allowed such
diversification, shareholders would, so the argument continues, refuse to
invest in specific companies and would therefore fail to provide the capital
necessary to finance industry.  The logical end of the portfolio theory argu-
ment returns to the premise that stockholders provide financing for indus-
trial production.  But this premise is precisely the question at issue—the
data demonstrates that stockholders do not importantly provide financing
for industrial production, both as an historical and as a contemporary mat-
ter.  That financing historically has come principally from retained earn-
ings and debt.45
While the argument from finance theory is elegant and is logical within
its assumptions, the assumptions fail on the facts.  The conclusion remains
that stockholders can be seen as specialists in risk bearing only because of
the existence of a public market, and the market for industrial equities
exists primarily as a historically contingent fact, largely unrelated to the
(1992); Fischer Black, Bank Funds Management in an Efficient Market, 2 J. FIN. ECON., at 323
(1975) (assuming an efficient market when stating that finance should track stock perform-
ance). More generally, in an equity market in which capital gains are the principal focus of
investors, collective irrationality is quite common. Id. at 988 (arguing that the rise in specula-
tive short term investments has led to an increase in irrational market activity).
44. I do not mean to suggest that systematic risk would be entirely eliminated or that
financial institutions would not suffer in their investments from systematic risk. Instead, the
return demanded by financial institutions—whose profits would not come from trading, but
from dividends and interest—would likely be more finely calibrated to the risks inherent in
individual corporate investments rather than exogenous factors.  A closer correlation be-
tween actual corporate performance and returns on investments would likely result. The
same result could be accomplished in the stock market if each market participant (or the
overwhelming majority of market participants) invested on the basis of fundamentals and
focused more on returns from corporate cash flow than from trading profits.
45. See Mitchell, Legitimate Rights, supra note 34, at 1643 n. 23. Since the data demon-
strates a dramatic recent decrease in retained earnings, it is fair to ask whether the historic
reliance on internal financing can continue.
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financing of productive enterprise.46 If this is true, then the market exists
for the sake of the market, and investment in equities very much resem-
bles the gambling it is often accused of being.47  In this manner, modern
finance theory nicely illustrates the gap between the real economy and the
finance economy, and raises significant unexamined questions about the
stock market’s real contribution to economic growth.
2. The Mythology of Capital Gains
A second issue is the source of stockholder gains.  Since 1980, stock
market volatility has dramatically increased and there has been a precipi-
tous drop in internal corporate resources—matched with a run-up in bor-
rowed funds.48  Empirical evidence increasingly points to a managerial
focus on short-term stock prices during this period, even at the expense of
business development, culminating in a dramatic increase in stock
buybacks from 2004 to 2007.  During that period, the S&P 500 spent more
(both in the aggregate and as a simple majority of corporations) on stock
buybacks than on productive capital, and dramatically more than on re-
search and development.49
History demonstrates a significant shift in investment style over time.
Through the 1950s, those who invested in public equity did so primarily for
dividends.  Indeed the New York Stock Exchange emphasized dividends in
its “Own Your Share of American Business” campaign to induce larger
numbers of Americans to invest in the stock market, as well as to establish
a broader base with which to lobby against double taxation.50 But matters
changed in the 1960s and have continued along the path then set: the de-
sire for dividends gave way to the demand for capital appreciation.
To some extent, this shift was planned and encouraged by the New
York Stock Exchange, which was suffering from a lack of business in the
1950s.  The NYSE clearly contemplated that increasing share ownership
would enhance the speculative character of the market (as eventually it
did).51  For example, in its 1955 Annual Report, it noted the low annual
46. See, e.g., MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY, supra note 16, at 1-29.
47. See e.g., JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, IN-
TEREST AND MONEY bk. IV, at 147-64 (1935); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Morals of the Mar-
ketplace: A Cautionary Essay for Our Time, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 171, 180 (2009).
48. Mitchell, Legitimate Rights, supra note 34, at 1671
49. HOWARD SILVERBLATT & DAVE GUARINO, S&P BUYBACKS: THREE YEARS AND
$1.3 TRILLION LATER, STANDARD & POOR’S, at 1, 5-6 (Dec. 2007). At least a partial explana-
tion for this high number may be the tax holiday granted by the Homeland Reinvestment Act
of 2004, which facilitated repatriation of foreign earnings by U.S. companies operating
abroad. See Dhammika Dharmapala, C. Fritz Foley & Kristin Forbes, Watch What I Do, Not
What I Say: The Unintended Consequences of the Homeland Investment Act, 66 J. FIN. 753,
756 (2011).
50. See, e.g., Janice Trafler, “Own Your Share of American Business”: Public Relations
at the NYSE During the Cold War, BUS. & ECON. HIST., no. 1, 2003.
51. One exception to the drive toward speculation appears to have been perhaps the
greatest popularizer of post-Depression common stock investment and a creator of the
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turnover of 19%, stating, “[t]his is to be expected, of course, in a cash
market of an investment character.”52  Low turnover meant low commis-
sions and low profits for the specialists who controlled the NYSE, and the
annual report went on to complain that the Federal Reserve Board had
raised margin requirements twice that year—an action it believed to be
harmful to economic growth by diminishing market liquidity.53  Explosive
market development in the following years, with a marked turn to invest-
ing for capital gains, demonstrates the success of the NYSE’s programs,
despite the failure of the Federal Reserve Board to reduce significantly
(sometimes even increasing) margin rates.54
This shift to capital gains investing has significant implications for cor-
porate finance and governance.  The famous Miller-Modigliani irrelevance
theory,55 which, although debated, has wide adherence,56 holds in part
that dividend policy should be irrelevant to share price, transactions costs
and taxation aside.57  Once the issuer has disclosed its investment policy,
the ratio of dividend payouts should not matter to shareholders because,
among other things, share value depends upon the earnings value of the
company’s assets.  The source of financing of those earnings, whether in-
ternally from retained earnings or externally from debt or new equity,
should not matter.  Investors should be rationally indifferent between re-
ceiving dividends and capital gains because public stock prices in a broad
and efficient market should discount all future cash flows to present value
and incorporate them in the stock price.58 Thus one could receive divi-
NYSE’s Monthly Investment Plan, Charles Merrill and the firm he founded. Merrill appears
to have been concerned with ensuring that new investors were careful in assessing the risks
they took and prudent in their investments. See generally Edwin J. Perkins, FROM WALL
STREET TO MAIN STREET: CHARLES MERRILL AND MIDDLE CLASS INVESTORS (1999) (sug-
gesting that that Merrill popularized common stock investing in a fairly conservative way).
52. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE AND AFFILIATED COMPANIES, ANNUAL REPORT
FOR 1955, at 14.
53. Id.
54. Federal Reserve Board, 94th ANNUAL REPORT, at 323 tbl.8 (2007) (showing Initial
Margin Requirements under Regulations T, U, and X); Peter Fortune, Margin Requirements,
Margin Loans, and Margin Rates: Practices and Principles, NEW ENG. ECON. REV.,
Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 19.  I do not mean to attribute this entire shift to the actions of the NYSE,
for the story is far more complicated. I only cite the NYSE as one player, albeit an important
one, in a critical shift in investing styles that raises questions about the macroeconomic role
of U.S. public equities markets.
55. See, e.g., Merton Miller & Franco Modigliani, The Cost of Capital, Corporation
Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV., no. 3, 1958, at 261 [hereinafter,
Miller & Modigliani, The Cost of Capital]; see generally Merton Miller & Franco Modigliani,
Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. BUS. 411 (1961) [hereinafter,
Miller & Modigliani, Dividend Policy].
56. See generally, Beyond Irrelevance, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 9, 2006), http://
www.economist.com/node/5492253.
57. See generally Miller & Modigliani, The Cost of Capital, supra note 55; see generally
Miller & Modigliani, Dividend Policy, supra note 55,.
58. Miller and Modigliani expressly define “rational behavior” as meaning that “inves-
tors . . . are indifferent as to whether a given increment to their wealth takes the form of cash
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dends over the long term by holding onto the stock, or realize them now
by selling the stock and receiving the equivalent of those dividends in the
form of capital gains—the proportion of the selling price that captures the
seller’s share of present and future retained earnings as well as future divi-
dends.59  Thus the shift to shareholder expectations of profits from capital
gains should be untroubling because it should be irrelevant.
Understanding this argument in light of the contemporary understand-
ing that one derives capital gains from discounted future dividends re-
quires emphasizing one very important fact: dividends must be paid out of
cash earned currently, or at least cash that is held by the corporation, and
therefore certain.  Discounted future dividends, even if the market is effi-
cient, are uncertain and hence a risky proposition.  Because these dis-
counted dividends will only come in the (unpredictable) future, they do
not exist at the time that a stockholder sells his shares for capital apprecia-
tion.  Further, as a matter of financial reality, they are only as good as the
assumptions one makes in applying various valuation models to the corpo-
ration’s earnings and cash flows.60  So in one very real sense, the capital
gains seller is shorting future dividends, and the capital gains buyer is gam-
bling that the rather significant assumptions upon which valuation models
are built turn out to be correct, or at least that he can find someone else to
buy the stock who believes them to be correct.
It is important to note that actual retained earnings have more or less
disappeared from the books of industrial corporations since Miller and
Modigliani wrote.  Now the capital gains trader is effectively buying or
selling what used to be referred to as “water.”  While financial theory
might establish equivalence, taking one’s profits in capital gains (taken as
discounted future cash flows rather than as accumulated retained earn-
ings) is a very different proposition in real economic terms from receiving
a check from a corporation with money in the bank.61
The disappearance of retained earnings might well have significant im-
plications for the continuing validity of the Modigliani-Miller theory.
Miller and Modigliani published their papers in 1958 and 1961.  Retained
earnings in 1961 constituted between 40% and 61% of corporate balance
sheets, little changed from 1958.62  Capital gains thus appear to have been
supported by real deferred dividends, held in the form of retained earn-
payments or an increase in the market value of their holdings of shares.” Miller & Modi-
gliani, Dividend Policy, supra note 55, at 412.
59. Id.
60. See Marco Pagano, Fabiano Panetta & Luigi Zingales, Why Do Companies Go
Public? An Empirical Analysis, 53 J. FIN. 27, 28 (1998). Studying a sample of Italian corpora-
tions, Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales conclude that investment and profitability tend to di-
minish following an IPO, and that the greatest single predictor of whether a firm will
undertake an IPO is a high market-to-book ratio.
61. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Whose Capital; What Gains?, 49 ISSUES IN GOVERNANCE
STUD. July 2012, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, at 1, 5-6.
62. Id. at 6.
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ings.  While one assumes that market movements also affected stockholder
profits, there were in fact balance sheet assets to support stock prices.63
Thus the irrelevance demonstrated by Modigliani and Miller made perfect
sense in 1961, even in light of the fact that valuation methods all are, nec-
essarily, future -oriented.64  The situation is dramatically different when,
as we see in 2005, retained earnings constituted 11% of corporate balance
sheet equity, following a steady thirty-year decline.
Capital gains are no longer supported by balance sheet assets.  Market
movements constitute virtually the entire amount of shareholder capital
gains.  Whatever power the irrelevance theory had at mid-century, the dis-
appearance of retained earnings from corporate balance sheets would
seem to cast it in an entirely different and far less persuasive light.
Recently, the dividend irrelevance provision has also been challenged
head on in a provocative article by Harry DeAngelo and Linda De-
Angelo.65  DeAngelo and DeAngelo’s critical starting insight is that Miller
and Modigliani fail to answer their own question about dividend policy
because their assumptions, taken together, demand that 100% of free cash
flow be paid to shareholders in each period, with no earnings retention
possible.  In a well-reasoned argument, they conclude that dividend policy
matters in precisely the same way that investment policy does.  While the
realization that Miller and Modigliani demand 100% payouts may seem to
undercut the preceding discussion of retained earnings, such a conclusion
would be wrong.  The free cash flow at issue exists, by definition, only
after funds have been invested.  The income statement focus of this analy-
sis does not, and does not need to, explicitly acknowledge the fact that if
internally generated cash flow or the proceeds from externally-distributed
equity are invested prior to determining free cash flow, those funds will
appear in the equity portion of the balance sheet, the former as retained
63. As to stock price movements, it is worth noting that volatility, expressed as turno-
ver, was very low. See Annual Reported Volume, Turnover Rate, Reported Trades (Mils. Of
Shares), NYXdata.com, http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?
mode=table&key=2206&category=4 (last visited May 8, 2017). Froot, Perold, and Stein dis-
tinguish mere turnover from real volatility, arguing that while turnover has significantly in-
creased, volatility has not as a result of increased market capacity. They do, however, note
the possibility that informational asymmetries between management and the market might
well induce short-term managerial incentives. Kenneth A. Froot, Andre Perold & Jeremy C.
Stein, Shareholder Trading Practices and Corporate Investment Horizons, 5 J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN., at 42 (1992). While their argument is powerful, it is somewhat limited by the fact that it
was made in 1992, before the very dramatic turnover increases in the early 21st century.  It
would be interesting to apply their methodology to that period to see if their conclusions
hold.
64. Miller and Modigliani’s work was designed to show the irrelevance of dividend
policy on stock prices. They were careful to account for the need to finance both dividend
payments and corporate investments either through retained earnings, current income, or
debt. See Miller & Modigliani, Dividend Policy, supra note 55, at 429
65. See generally Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, The Irrelevance of the MM
Dividend Irrelevance Theorem,  (2005) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
680855.
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earnings.  Indeed, Miller and Modigliani themselves must assume the exis-
tence of retained earnings because they treat, as a special case, a situation
in which investment funds “come only from retained earnings.”66  De-
Angelo and DeAngelo’s critique, therefore, does not appear to undercut
my argument.67
The argument that the stock market stimulates economic growth
through its diminution of risk by facilitating information flows and dimin-
ishing transactions costs does not appear to be supported when the nature
of the risks and the flow of funds are closely examined.  Close analysis
shows that those risks primarily are risks of the capital markets, not the
risks of a productive economy.  This conclusion, however, may not be sig-
nificant if risk reduction—no matter the nature of the risks—in fact helps
public equity markets allocate capital to productive uses.  As I will now
explore, public equity markets appear to have a role in allocating capital,
but (1) the empirical evidence does not clearly support this conclusion and
(2) the extent to which public equity markets allocate capital is overstated
and indirect.
B. Capital Allocation Arguments
At this point, it seems appropriate to return to the paradox with which
I began and with which the economic literature does not appear to address
in any significant manner.  While economic theory provides plausible the-
oretical explanations for why equity capital is made available to finance
production, the fact is public equity capital does not appear to finance
production except under certain narrowly specific circumstances.68 If eq-
uity does not provide finance, it does not seem likely that it can be an
important factor in allocating capital.69 This conundrum may explain the
66. Miller & Modigliani, Dividend Policy, supra note 55, at 424.
67. This is so even though Miller and Modigliani argue that debt financing (which they
introduce after assuming an all-equity world) would not affect their thesis. Miller & Modi-
gliani, Dividend Policy, supra note 55, at 429-30. While debt was an important source of
corporate financing at the time they wrote, the average corporation had a healthy chunk of
retained earnings to back borrowings.
68. In a study covering the period 1988 to 2004, Huang, Mayer, and Sussman find that
firms typically rely upon internal sources of financing. In the face of severe cash flow shocks,
financing turns to trade credit, inventory depletion, and cash depletion. Over time, their pre-
shock leverage ratio is restored by the issuance of new equity. See generally Zhangkai
Huang, Colin Mayer, & Oren Sussman, How Do Firms Finance Large Cash Flow Require-
ments? (Oxford Fin. Research Ctr., OFRC Working Paper Series 2008fe06, 2008). Gilchrist,
Himmelberg, and Huberman find that equity issuances increase in response to stock price
bubbles. See generally Simon Gilchrist, Charles P. Himmelberg, & Gur Huberman, Do Stock
Price Bubbles Influence Corporate Investment? 52 J. MONETARY ECON. 805 (2005). See gen-
erally also, Malcolm Baker, Jeremy C. Stein, & Jeffrey Wurgler, When Does the Market Mat-
ter?  Stock Prices and the Investment of Equity-Dependent Firms, 118 Q. J.  ECON. 969 (2003)
(arguing, among other things, that what they define as “equity-dependent firms” are firms
that find investment constrained when stock prices are low due to non-fundamental causes).
69. There is an argument that creditors follow the stock market in evaluating credit
and providing debt. See Black, supra note 43, at 329 (arguing that in an efficient market, a
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relative paucity of studies making strong causal claims from stock market
development to economic growth.  The literature, nonetheless, does make
a case for the correlation between stock market development and eco-
nomic growth.70 The issue demands examination.
The role of public equity markets in allocating capital and financing
productivity is the weakest link in the literature.  Some of this weakness
stems from the more general problem of the difficulties of assessing the
contribution of the stock market to economic growth and perhaps an ex-
planation as to why causation has been so difficult to establish.
Among some of the difficulties in assessing the importance of the stock
market are the metrics one uses to determine stock market development.
For example, Beck and Levine use turnover ratio.  They reject as inade-
quate measures of value traded (value of domestic trades over GDP) and
market capitalization (value of listed shares over GDP).  The former is
rejected because it fails to measure liquidity and also because it anticipates
growth that has not yet occurred.  The latter because it measures little
other than the quantity of listings which, standing alone, says little or noth-
ing about economic growth.71
Turnover also is an inadequate metric.  While it certainly indicates
market activity, and thus, can serve as a proxy for liquidity, it has little
obvious relationship to corporate growth.  First, the liquidity of the market
says nothing about the uses of liquid funds.  If anything, the 2008 financial
crisis has shown us that liquidity can be used for no better purpose than to
purchase speculative derivative securities that do not finance productivity
but rather serve to create further liquidity without apparent economic
purpose.
Liquidity per se is no guarantee that capital will find its way into fi-
nancing production.  It can, for example, be withdrawn from the market
and used for consumption, or it can be saved for future investment or con-
sumption.  It is also possible, although unlikely over the long-term, that
such withdrawals could be hoarded and kept unproductive.  Related to
this point, virtually the entire turnover measured occurs in the secondary
market, which has no direct relationship to corporate finance.  A far better
metric might be the relationship of external equity financing to capital for-
mation, either in terms of stated capital, retained earnings and deprecia-
publicly traded company’s stock price will be the principal source of credit information for
banks, and concluding that because regulations in the U.S. are largely avoidable, this asser-
tion should remain true even in a regulated market).  While an examination of this claim is
beyond the scope of this article, the analysis I provide suggests, if this is correct, the credit
markets are misguided.
70. See generally Levine & Zervos, supra note 5. But see H.R. Garretsen, H.R. Len-
sink & E. Sterken, Growth, Financial Development, Societal Norms and Legal Institutions, J.
INT’L FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS AND MONEY, at 165 (2004), (negating Levine and Zervos’
findings when controlling for legal and societal factors).
71. Beck & Levine, supra, note 6, at 428.
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tion, or additions to assets carried at cost.72  Economists largely are in
agreement that retained earnings and debt, not equity finance, have tradi-
tionally been the primary sources of funds for investment in productive
capital.73
Studies employing GDP measures, providing reasonable proxies for
economic growth to support some claims of causation, seem to provide
some of the best evidence of the broader relationship between finance and
growth from the growth side of the equation.74  But problems remain.  For
example, Neusser and Klugel use financial sector GDP and manufacturing
sector GDP to assess this relationship.  Ignoring for the moment the sub-
stantially diminished proportion of the manufacturing sector’s contribu-
tion to U.S. GDP,75 which itself ought to suggest that this metric of growth
is not especially informative, studies that link GDP growth to financial
sector growth still fail to account for the use of funds employed by the
financial sector or, to put it differently, the extent to which financial sector
funds are directed toward productive economic use.  Indeed, over the last
several decades, the financial sector has increasingly turned to various
forms of proprietary trading and sales of derivative securities—which do
not themselves finance production—for substantial portions of their
profits.76
1. Reducing the Cost of Capital
In an influential paper dealing with financial markets broadly consid-
ered, Rajan and Zingales, taking a microeconomic perspective, present
empirical findings based on differences between industries within individ-
ual countries to suggest that financial development indeed has a causal
relationship to economic growth through the capital allocation function.77
They start from the theoretical explanation that one mechanism by which
financial development facilitates growth is by reducing the cost of capital
to business through the kind of liquidity and information mechanisms that
“help a firm overcome problems of moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion. . .” but then acknowledge the obvious fact that “[i]t is ultimately the
72. See generally Mitchell, Legitimate Rights, supra note 34 (exhibiting an example of
this approach).
73. Levine, Financial Development, supra note 2, at 720; Arestis et al., Financial Devel-
opment and Economic Growth, supra note 3, at 19; Colin Mayer, New Issues in Corporate
Finance, 32 EURO. ECON. REV. 1167, 1175 (1998).
74. See Klaus Neussner & Maurice Kugler, Manufacturing Growth and Financial De-
velopment: Evidence from OECD Countries, 80 REV. ECON. AND STATISTICS 638 (1998);
King & Levine, supra note 4, at 717.
75. U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, Gross-Domestic-Product-Industry Accounts,
Value Added by Industry (1958-2008) https://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm.
76. ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM J. WILHELM, JR., INVESTMENT BANKING: INSTI-
TUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW, at 30, 34, 247, 303 (2007).
77. See generally Rajan and Zingales, supra note 2.
176 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 6:155
availability of profitable investment opportunities that drives
growth . . . .”78
They conclude that financial development causes growth in this man-
ner with respect to industries that are heavily dependent upon external
financing.  This analysis, on its face, appears to be tautological.  Among
these industries, they include newer firms.  Their data show that “financial
development has almost twice the economic effect on the growth of the
number of establishments as it has on the growth of the average size of the
establishment,”79 suggesting that a potentially important way in which fi-
nancial development could affect growth is by helping newer firms, which
may be more dependent upon external capital and possibly more innova-
tive, survive.80  I explore the relationship between the public equity mar-
ket and business creation in detail in Part 3.8.
Rajan and Zingales use broad measures of financial development, but
in light of the fact that their principal control case is the United States,
they may be implicitly assuming the importance of the stock market (al-
though they also acknowledge the absence of strong causal claims for
stock market influence alone).81  They also note, from their own work, the
unimportance of equity financing for productive capital, at least in the
1980s, which is consistent with the data both for that and earlier periods.82
2. Legal Norms of Binding Management
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, also starting with the premise that
developed financial systems are important because they provide capital
and information, draw relatively strong conclusions about the role of de-
veloped stock markets and well-developed legal systems in facilitating cap-
ital formation and thus economic growth.  Their particular focus is the
legal system’s role in ensuring credible commitments by managers to avoid
opportunistic behavior, whether through contractual enforcement or fidu-
ciary duties.  They conclude that ‘[f]irms in countries that have active stock
markets and high ratings for compliance with legal norms are able to ob-
tain external funds and grow faster,” noting also that stock market size is
not especially relevant but stock market activity is.83
78. Id at 560-1.
79. Id.
80. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 21, at 765 (also noting the importance of external
equity finance to new enterprises).
81. See Rajan and Zingales, supra note 2, at 561.
82. See id at 569.
83. Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic, Law, Finance, and Firm Growth, 53
J.Fin. 2107, 2134, 2134 (1998); see also, Rene Stultz, Does Financial Structure Matter for Eco-
nomic Growth? A Corporate Finance Perspective, in FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH: A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON OF BANKS, MARKETS, AND DEVELOPMENT, at
144 (Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Ross Levine, eds.; 2001).
Michael D. Bordo and Peter L. Rousseau recently have empirically concluded, albeit ten-
tatively, that the origins of a country’s legal system (English common law vs. civil law) corre-
lates with financial development, and more strongly that political factors like “proportional
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One conclusion is of particular interest.  They note that rates of return
on invested capital tend to be lower in countries with active stock markets
and well-developed legal systems, an observation they attribute to the dis-
count provided by the decreased risk such systems provide.84  This leads to
lower retained earnings and therefore a greater dependence on external
financing.
But this conclusion must be evaluated carefully.  The data they ex-
amine run from 1980 to 1991.  My own data also show a steady decrease in
retained earnings during this period.  It has also been suggested that the
American stock market achieved its greatest efficiency after the 1970s,85
so that later period data may indeed reveal a transformation in financing
practice.  Nonetheless, in the United States, retained earnings formed
somewhere between 40% and 61% of the investment capital available to
American non-financial corporations at least through the 1960s and, to-
gether with various forms of debt, easily accounted for two-thirds to al-
most three quarters of corporate finance during this period.  The data is
even more striking for the earlier part of the 20th century.
Even acknowledging the dramatic drop in retained earnings during this
period, it is data covering this same later period that Rousseau and Wach-
tel use to show the weakness of the finance-growth nexus.  Taking
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic’s conclusion as accurate, it seems wrong
to conclude that the external financing with which American corporations
are replacing their internal equity is external equity.  The data demon-
representation election systems, frequent elections, and infrequent revolutions or coups are
consistent with larger financial sectors and higher conditional rates of economic growth.”
Michael D. Bordo & Peter L. Rousseau, Legal-Political Factors and the Historical Evolution
of the Finance-Growth Link 25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12035,
2006).
One implication of their work may be that financial development per se is not as critical
as some scholars assert, but the that preconditions of a stable democratic legal and political
system are critical, although Bordo and Rousseau also note that a significant aspect of the
finance-growth nexus is not explained by legal and political factors. Id; see also Rafael La
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Determinants of External Fi-
nance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1149-50 (1997); see generally RAGHURAM G. RAJAN AND LUIGI ZIN-
GALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE CAPITALISTS: UNLEASHING THE POWER OF
FINANCIAL MARKETS TO CREATE WEALTH AND SPREAD OPPORTUNITY (2003); Peter L.
Rousseau & Richard Sylla, Financial Systems, Economic Growth, and Globalization,
GLOBALIZATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, at 373 (Michael D. Bordo, Alan  M. Taylor, &
Jeffrey G. Williamson, eds., 2003). Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine conclude that the im-
portant legal origins determinant of financial growth is the adaptability of the legal system to
change. Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, & Ross Levine, Law and Finance: Why Does
Legal Origin Matter? 31 J. COMP. ECON., at 653 (2003). See also, Thorsten Beck, Asli
Demirguc-Kunt, & Ross Levine, Legal Theories of Financial Development. 17 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL., at 483 (2001).
84. Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, supra note 83, at 2122. The positive flip side of this
is that the cost of capital is lower in such countries.
85. Jeffrey N. Gordon The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1541, et. seq.
(2007) (analyzing increases in SEC reporting requirements to increase market information
and thus efficiency).
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strate significantly negative external equity financing during the period
they cover, at least for non-farm, non-financial corporations (financial cor-
porations show an opposite trend), and indeed for the entire period from
the early 1980s to the present except for a minor three-year positive trend
between 1991 and 1994.  Debt, not equity, appears to have replaced the
depleted retained earnings, which would suggest that financial in-
termediaries play a far more significant role than external equity in Amer-
ican corporate finance.86
3. Equity in a Time of Distress
Huang, Mayer, and Sussman empirically evaluate two theories of capi-
tal structure that have important implications for the capital allocation ar-
gument.87 The trade-off theory treats firms as having a “target” capital
structure to which they return when circumstances result in misalignment.
The “pecking order” theory privileges debt and retained earnings, and ar-
gues that firms turn to external equity only after the first two sources have
been depleted.  Departing from earlier studies, Huang and his coauthors
study the financing behavior of firms that have been subjected to signifi-
cant cash flow shocks.  What they find is consistent with the pecking order
theory prior to the shock, with behavior that would be predicted by the
trade-off theory occurring within the three years following the shock.  In
other words, pre-shock financing is largely from internal cash flow, with
the shock financed with trade credit, inventory reductions, and retained
earnings.  Debt issuances increase following the shock, but gradually are
replaced with new equity issuances.  Thus they conclude, among other
things, that there are times when external equity importantly finances cash
flow, although the conclusion is significantly more pronounced for smaller
firms than for larger firms.
Huang, Mayer, and Sussman’s conclusions suggest that equity serves as
an important form of what one might call emergency financing, that is, as a
means to replace depleted capital and reduce increased leverage as a re-
sult of cash flow shocks.  Their data is drawn from U.S. corporations from
1988 to 2004.  Interestingly, this is a period for which Federal Flow of
Funds data show significant negative net equity issuances for American
corporations.  So how can their results be squared with this information?
Their data includes both financial and non-financial corporations.
While overall U.S. net equity issues are negative for the period, equity
issues by financial corporations are significantly positive.  One explanation
might be that emergency equity is more commonly raised by financial cor-
porations than non-financials, most likely in order to satisfy regulatory re-
quirements or to support increased leverage.  Another is that as cash flow-
shocked corporations recover, they return to the practice, common during
this period, of returning significant amounts of equity to their shareholders
86. See Mitchell, Legitimate Rights, supra note 34, at 1662-63.
87. Huang et al., supra note 68, at 3.
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through dividends, stock buybacks, and recapitalizations.  Nevertheless,
their conclusions must be acknowledged as at least a potentially significant
qualification to my skepticism about the market’s importance.
Another more straightforward (or at least more conventional) explana-
tion, however, is that the public equity market is a necessary stimulus to
industrial creation.88  Public stockholders do not provide investment capi-
tal, so this story goes—what they actually do when purchasing stock is buy
the shares of retained earnings or, in the absence of retained earnings, the
claims on earnings, of those that do provide investment capital.  Thus, the
argument goes, original stock purchasers rely upon the exit option in order
to provide equity capital in the first place.  In the absence of that liquidity,
investment in risky projects would be less likely to occur, and thus the link
between liquidity and growth is really a link between liquidity and busi-
ness formation.  The presence of liquid markets stimulates the creation of
businesses, which then grow as a matter of course through retained earn-
ings and debt financing, ideally increasing GDP and employment.  I will
evaluate the strength of this argument in Part IV.
IV. FINANCING NEW ENTERPRISE
On its face, the argument that a public equity market is a necessary
stimulus to industrial creation by facilitating exit options for investors is a
strong argument, at least in theory, to justify the existence of an active
stock market.  The market’s function is not to aggregate permanent invest-
ment capital, which in mature companies is provided by retained earnings
and debt,89 but rather to stimulate business formation by providing exit
options for private investors who supply start-up capital and entrepreneurs
who want to diversify.  Permanent investment capital follows as a matter
of continued earnings and corporate borrowing, with equity buyers sharing
in the corporation’s retained earnings as a reward for their willingness to
let the entrepreneurs out.
There are, however several problems with this argument.
A. The Historical Evidence
The first is historical.  The historical record, although not undisputed,
makes it relatively clear that, from the beginning of industrialization, most
risk capital was provided primarily by creditors.  Thus, one cannot say in
any strong sense that subsequent public stockholders purchased a position
in the risk capital provided by earlier stockholders.  Instead they can be
seen as taking the debt holders out.  Yet it clearly is not the case that all
capital was aggregated in the form of debt and in fact some industries like
railroads raised significant public equity.  Indeed, recent scholarship dem-
onstrates that more public equity than previously thought may have pro-
88. Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital
Markets: Banks versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 272-73 (1998).
89. See generally Mitchell, Legitimate Rights, supra note 34.
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vided initial capitalization for some segments of American industry,
although not as the principal source.90
Moreover, in the early years of the 20th century, widespread corporate
exit was a function more of contingent opportunity91 or tax incentives than
planned business behavior at the time of corporate formation.  While take-
over markets, private equity funds, and venture capitalists have made a
strategy of finance and exit appear to be natural, those were not the con-
cerns of nineteenth century industrialists.  Entrepreneurs like Andrew
Carnegie demanded significant inducements to exit businesses that pro-
duced cash flows adequate to create rather impressive fortunes.  The
merger wave of the turn of the twentieth century provided opportunity but
also, in some very real sense, created competitive necessity.  While Car-
negie would likely have continued to prosper in the face of the creation of
U.S. Steel, that corporation would have produced a competitor of an en-
tirely different scale than Carnegie had seen.  His participation in the ven-
ture enhanced the competitive positions of both enterprises.92
At the same time, the opportunity to exit the firm through newly liquid
capital markets might well have contributed to economic growth by per-
mitting the survival and prospering of firms that had lost their en-
trepreneurial head to a second, less competent, generation.  Navin and
Sears, reversing the causal relationship from financial development to
growth, point out the extent to which the second-generation desire for exit
helped to contribute to the existence of a liquid market for industrial se-
curities.93  Rather than exit serving as a precondition to business invest-
ment, the market itself was created by the desire for exit from already
established industrial corporations.94  The more-or-less forced public of-
90. See generally Rousseau & Sylla, supra note 2.  Peter L. Rousseau & Paul Wachtel,
Financial Intermediation and Economic Performance: Historical Evidence from Five Industri-
alized Countries 30 J. MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 657, 688 (1998) (finding that financial
intermediaries played a significant role in economic growth in the U.S. from 1870 to 1929).
91. See MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY, supra note 16, at 1-29.
92. See generally HAROLD JAMES, FAMILY CAPITALISM: WENDELS, HANIELS, FALCKS,
AND THE CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN MODEL (2006) (containing a history of European indus-
trial development from the perspective of founding families and their ownership perpetua-
tion). A recent rich and fascinating paper by Julian Franks, Colin Mayer, Paolo Volpin, and
Hannes Wagner concludes, among other things, that the type of financial development (debt
versus equity) has an effect on the way family firms evolve (e.g., from family firms to more
widely held firms), that Continental European countries in which family firms predominate
have seen, over the preceding decade, a pronounced shift from what they call “insider sys-
tems” (dominated by family control) to “outsider systems” (in which ownership tends to be
held in broad public markets, but that this evolution has not resulted in diminished
survivability of family firms in insider systems, and that firms in outsider systems (in their
sample set, the U.K.) are more profitable than firms in insider systems (France, Germany,
Italy), although in these latter systems, family firms are more profitable than those that are
not. See generally Julian Franks, Colin Mayer, Paolo Volpin, & Hannes F. Wagner, The Life
Cycle of Family Ownership: International Evidence, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1675 (2012).
93. See generally, Thomas R. Navin, and Marian V. Sears, The Rise of a Market for
Industrial Securities, 1887-1902, 29 BUS. HIST. REV. 105 (1955).
94. Id. See also, MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY, supra note 16, at 1-29.
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fering of shares of the New York Central Railroad following Cornelius
Vanderbilt’s death and its control passing to his son, William, is an illustra-
tion of this phenomenon.95
Even if public equity was a relatively small proportion of early indus-
trial capitalizations, one could still argue that subsequent stockholders
purchased the initial investors’ shares of retained earnings.  But this argu-
ment comes into question in light of the very heavy dependence of much
of industry on debt.96  And it appears to be the case that, over the past
forty years, equity capital has overwhelmingly been replaced with debt.97
Thus the “successor shareholder” argument is more complicated.  Ameri-
can industry’s principal risk capital has shifted dramatically away from re-
tained earnings to debt and thus it is the case that the successor
shareholders’ position is not supported by early equity investment so much
as it is supported by the capital of creditors.  As a matter of simple eco-
nomics, stripped of legal form, creditors have, for most of modern corpo-
rate history, been the principal owners of American industry.
It is clear that as early as the middle of the 20th century, the profits of
public shareholders piggybacked on the risk capital contributed by credi-
tors or, to put it differently, creditors were providing the bulk of the risk
capital that had not been generated from the early investments of entre-
preneurs.  One could argue that the legal claims of equity and debt have
long been settled such that this observation, while interesting, is not prob-
lematic.  But the overlay of legal form on economic reality shows that
those who control the risk capital, that is, the shareholders, do not provide
that risk capital.
The mismatch permits managers, who are put in place indirectly by the
shareholders, to engage in risk-taking with potentially large benefits to the
shareholders but with potentially significant adverse consequences to the
debt-holders.  Again, this is not necessarily a problem of fairness as be-
tween the different financial claimants because of the established exis-
tence of legal forms and the ability of creditors to self-protect through
contract.  But it does present a problem of incentives that have potentially
significant negative effects on the productive economy.  As I suggested
earlier, the mid-century turn in investment style from the expectation of
dividends to speculation for capital gains generated by stock price appreci-
ation suggests at least the possibility that managers would turn from stable
and growing production to managing for stock price appreciation in a
manner that damages long-term business health.
It appears to be the case that American industrial corporations, both
historically and in more recent times, have demonstrated little need for
public equity financing, at least as a matter of normal development and
growth.  More important, it may be that a broad and active public market
95. MORRISON AND WILHELM, supra note 76, at 167.
96. Mitchell, Legitimate Rights, supra note 34, at 1676.
97. Id.
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in industrial securities may not be compatible with healthy long-term cor-
porate, and thus economic, growth.98  A far stronger argument that links
the stock market to real economic growth is that, at least in recent de-
cades, entrepreneurs and private equity investors have demanded the op-
portunity for easy exit through an active liquid market in order to be
induced to make their investments, and thus create productive businesses,
in the first place.  It is to this argument that I now turn.
B. The Contemporary Argument
The second flaw in this argument relates to the capital allocation func-
tion discussed above.  The capital allocation function relies heavily on the
same factors that stimulate the risk-sharing function.  Information costs
and liquidity risk come together at the initial point of corporate finance
and perhaps nowhere so pointedly as at the stage of initial capitalization.
The literature claims that high-risk investments would not be made in the
absence of liquidity options.99  While public equity has played a relatively
small role in financing mature industrial production, some amount of eq-
uity is privately issued at the start-up phase of a corporation, even if only
to the firm’s founders.100 Since we can assume that many entrepreneurs
lack sufficient capital to self-finance their businesses101 and since, for the
moment, we can further assume that creditors will demand some equity
cushion in order to reduce the risks imposed by debt financing, we can
further assume that entrepreneurs will seek additional outside (although
typically not public) equity.102
Thus the question arises: How would we finance high-risk ventures if
we didn’t have a public stock market to provide liquidity that allowed risk
98. For a consideration and nuanced rejection of this view, at least for larger firms, see
Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny, Matthew Shapiro, & James M. Poterba,
The Stock Market and Investment: Is the Market a Sideshow? 1990 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECON. ACTIVITY, no. 2, 1990, at 157.
99. See, Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Small Business Credit Availability and
Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure, 112 ECON. J., at
F32, F34-36, (2002) [hereinafter, Berger & Udell, Small Business Credit Availability]. Berger
and Udell are careful to note that their statistics are averages, with high variance, with high-
growth firms receiving substantially more venture capital. Id.
100. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J.
FIN. 737, 765 (1997) (“[W]e do observe equity financing primarily for young, growing firms,
as well as for firms in rapidly growing economies, whereas mature economies and mature
firms typically use bank finance when they rely on external funds at all.”).
101. But see Massimo G. Colombo & Luca Grilli, Funding Gaps? Access to Bank Loans
by High-Tech Start-Ups, 29 SMALL BUS. ECON. 25, 31 (2007) (finding that 84% of start-up
funding for high-tech start-ups in Italy was from the personal capital of entrepreneurs, rela-
tives, and friends).
102. Again it appears to be the case that business formation during nineteenth century
industrialization presents an empirical counter-example to this assumption. See Navin &
Sears, supra note 93, at 116; MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY, supra note 16, at 1-29.
But see generally Rousseau & Wachtel, supra note 1 (observing an active public equity mar-
ket in Boston before 1850).
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taking to be rewarded?  I will analyze the question from two theoretical
perspectives.  The first, the capital structure perspective, looks at alterna-
tives to equity in financing new enterprises.  The second considers the al-
ternatives to public stock markets in presenting exit strategies for initial
equity investors that are efficient both from a financial and economic
growth perspective.
Is equity required to finance new risky ventures?103  Fairly recent data
show that the average small U.S. firm (nonfarm, non-financial, non-real
estate) finances 49.63% with equity and the balance with debt.104 But the
equity sources are limited.  Almost two-thirds of equity comes from the
“principal owner,” an additional almost 13% comes from friends and fam-
ily, and just over 3.5% comes from angel finance, while “[v]enture capi-
tal . . . provide[s] 1.85% of small business finance.”105  As investors will
demand returns commensurate with their risk, and such returns are char-
acteristic of equity, one would think that equity is required.
But this is not necessarily the case.  On one level, the relationship be-
tween risk and return suggests that even high-risk ventures that have a
positive net present value could be financed largely with debt.106  After
all, returns adjust to fit the risk and this is no less true for fixed income
securities than it is for equity.  But this is probably not a satisfactory an-
swer.  One problem is that returns on debt might rise to a level where
those returns impose fixed costs upon a start-up business that it might well
be unable to meet.107  Although some venture capitalists finance with
debt, the debt is typically convertible into common stock, and it is to exit
103. See Rajan and Zingales, supra note 2, at 565 (“It is common wisdom in the corpo-
rate finance literature (though we were hard-pressed to find formal empirical studies of this
phenomenon) that there is a life cycle in the pattern of financing for firms; firms are more
dependent on external financing early in their life than later.”);; Claudio Michelacci & Javier
Suarez, Business Creation and the Stock Market, 71 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 459, 461(2002)
(arguing that the stock market encourages business creation as well as innovation and growth
through a “virtuous circle” of recycling “informed capital”). See also Colombo & Grilli, supra
note 101, at 27 (noting that in Europe, especially in countries with bank-based systems, “bank
loans are still the most important source of financing” even for new high-tech start-ups).
104. Berger & Udell, The Economics of Small Business Finance, supra note 25 at 5, 6.
105. Berger & Udell, The Economics of Small Business Finance, supra note 25, at 618.
They note that despite these averages, there are substantial differences among individual
firms. Id. at 15. In particular, high-tech and similar firms with high potential growth but little
in the way of tangible assets rely most heavily on external private equity financing. Id. They
also note that when insider finance runs out, external debt is the likely next step. Id. at 9.
106. Berger & Udell, The Economics of Small Business Finance, supra note 25, at 626
(noting “surprising” amount of debt provided to young start-up companies by financial insti-
tutions). There is a significant and developing literature challenging the Miller-Modigliani
hypothesis that firm value is unaffected by capital structure. See, e.g., Milton Harris & Artur
Raviv, Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt, 45 J. FIN. 321, (1990); Caprio &
Demirguc-Kunt, supra note 6,
107. Some studies suggest that, over time, interest rates and collateral requirements
even for small business borrowers diminish due to the nature of relationship banking. See,
e.g., Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small
Firms, 68 J. BUS. 351, 370 (1995).
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rather than current returns that venture capitalists look for their profits.108
The same is true for venture financing using preferred stock, as to which
dividends, while typically cumulative, are discretionary, allowing the cor-
poration at least temporarily to reduce fixed costs by withholding divi-
dends when necessary.  While preferred stock bears some equity risk that
is different in kind from the risk of nonpayment assumed by debt, those
who finance new ventures tend to view it in the same manner as they do
debt, and would be no more likely to finance with preferred stock if ready
exit were unavailable.109
Debt may provide other advantages as a form of start-up capital.  My-
ers presents an argument which leads to the implication that perhaps some
risky ventures may be more likely to finance with debt than more estab-
lished corporations.110 He begins with the proposition that corporations
facing risky investment decisions are less likely to have their market value
diminished by issuing risky debt than those with less risky options.111 He
rests his theory on the uncontroversial notion that firms are valued as go-
ing concerns, based both upon their existing assets and on the expectation
of future investments by the firm.112  While existing assets are, by defini-
tion, in place, future investments are not assured.  Indeed, they are discre-
tionary with management.  Thus future investment is in the nature of an
option, to be exercised by management acting in the best interest of the
corporation’s shareholders.
That option can be financed with equity or with debt.  Myers simplifies
the problem by assuming that debt is issued to replace equity for the pur-
pose of financing the project, not to purchase other assets.113  If the debt
matures “before the investment decision is made, but after the true state
of nature is revealed,” that is, after the value of the investment decision is
known, the corporation will pay off the debt and keep the value of the
investment for its shareholders.114 In this state of affairs, according to My-
ers, shareholders could “borrow the entire value of the firm.”115  When
debt matures after the investment must be made, the situation changes.  If
the value of the investment is less than the corporation’s initial outlay plus
payments due creditors, the managers will refuse to undertake a project
108. See generally Bing Guo , Yun Lou, & David Perez-Castrillo, Investment, Duration,
and  Exit Strategies for Corprate and Independent Venture Catpial-backed Start-ups, 24 J. OF
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 415, (2015) http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/
searlecenter/events/innovation/documents/Perez-Castrillo_Venture_Capital_Start-ups.pdf.
109. See Black & Gilson, supra note 88, at 253 n.4 (noting that venture capitalists
choose between convertible preferred stock and convertible debt).
110. But see LAMOREAUX, supra note 18, at 9 (arguing that banks are less likely to
finance risky ventures when they lend at arm’s length).
111. Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147, 167
(1997).
112. Id. at 148
113. Id. at 152
114. Id.
115. Id.
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with positive net present value, since its return will go to the creditors.116
This will adversely affect the market value of the corporation.  Thus, ac-
cording to Myers, the optimal policy for the corporation will be to issue no
debt at all in order to avoid being in a position in which it will have incen-
tives to refuse positive net present value projects.117
Debt is more likely to be issued, then, with respect to assets in place,
what Myers refers to as “real assets,” rather than “real options.”118  But,
as he notes, the difference is one of degree and not of kind, and some real
options have sufficiently distinct characteristics that a secondary market
exists for them, providing some security for a lender.119  Interestingly,
these include precisely the assets one would expect to find in a high-risk
start-up venture, like “patents, certain trademarks, franchises and operat-
ing licenses,” which should “ ‘support’ debt to the same extent as other-
wise similar real assets.”120
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Myers drops his assumption
that discretionary investment has no effect on the variance of a corpora-
tion’s market value.121  In this new state, it is reasonable to conclude that
the investment’s effect on variance can be sufficiently great as to diminish
or even wipe out value transfers from the investment from shareholders to
bondholders.  In this state, “[t]he impact of risky debt on the market value
of the firm is less for firms holding investment options on assets that are
risky relative to the firms’ present assets.  In this sense we may observe
risky firms borrowing more than safe ones.”122
It seems apparent that risky start-up corporations almost always invest
in one (or a very limited set) of options.  Since they constitute the same
option set as the corporation’s business itself, they will, by definition, in-
crease the variance of a corporation’s market value.  It is precisely in this
type of corporation that Myers predicts one ought to see risky firms en-
gage in substantial borrowing.  Thus the theory supports the possibility of
debt financing as forming at least a significant part of the risk capital of a
start-up corporation.123
This is not to claim that debt is a perfect substitute for equity and,
indeed, even Myers admits, “after a point the firm cannot borrow more by
116. Id. at 153
117. Id. at 154.
118. Id. at 163
119. Id. at .
120. Id. at 164.
121. Id. at 167.
122. Id. at 167.
123. Berger & Udell, The Economics of Small Business Finance, supra note 25, at 626
(comment on the “surprising” amount of finance provided by lenders to new businesses).
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offering to pay a higher interest rate.”124  There must then be a need for at
least some equity investment in high-risk start-ups.125
No sensible creditor would lend money to a venture that lacked an
asset base from which to look for repayment in the case of failure.126 One
answer to this might be that a combination of security interests (including
liens on intellectual property and entrepreneurs’ guarantees of the debt)
and the risk-adjusted returns on what we might refer to as “start-up debt”
would, ex ante, provide adequate security and compensation for lend-
ers.127  Another is that, as with equity-financed start-ups, there is always
an initial valuation of the company that brings to present value its antici-
pated performance in the future.  And there is the implication from My-
ers’ powerful conclusion that the high variance of risky projects provides
opportunity for entrepreneurs who take equity for assets rather than cash
to profit by issuing debt.
None of these appear to be satisfactory answers.128  At some level of
risk, debt (and preferred stock), functionally become common equity al-
though without equity’s participation.  Under these circumstances, the pu-
tative debt-holders possess the same incentives to behave in the same
manner as equity-holders (if the debt-holders have negotiated for equity-
like control rights),129 even assuming a debt market could sensibly exist at
interest rates sufficiently high to compensate investors for the risks of fail-
ure inherent in a new enterprise.130  Moreover, the existence of intangible
assets would not satisfy these imaginary lenders.131 Valuations are intrinsi-
124. Myers, supra note 111, at 154.
125. See generally John Boyd & Bruce Smith, The Coevolution of the Real and Financial
Sectors in the Growth Process, 10 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 371 (1996) (arguing more
broadly that equity and debt are complements and not substitutes).
126. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 21, at 765 (noting that, “[y]oung firms, and firms
with intangible assets, may need to be equity financed simply because their assets have little
or no liquidation value.”); see generally Robert E. Carpenter & Bruce Petersen, Capital Mar-
ket Imperfections, High-Tech Investment, and New Equity Financing, 112 THE ECON. J.
(2002) (noting a body of literature highlighting the importance of collateral to lenders).
127. But see Colombo & Grilli, supra note 101, at 4 (noting that interest rates on debt
are unlikely to be high enough to compensate lenders for risk of failure in technology-based
start-ups); Carpenter & Petersen, supra note 126, at F59 (to the same effect).
128. Stultz suggests four benefits of public markets even in the presence of bank financ-
ing: public markets allow entrepreneurs to “escape the bank” if the bank attempts to claim
excessive returns from the project; they provide a higher rate of return to the entrepreneur
than would more limited private markets which decrease the liquidity of his investment; they
aggregate information; and they facilitate risk sharing with financial intermediaries.  Stultz,
supra note 83, at 157.
129. The situation of a “controlling debt-holder” presents its own problems by putting
the creditor in a position, in which he is likely either to become equitably subordinated or to
find himself liable for the corporation’s debts to others.
130. Colombo and Grilli note that interest rates on debt are unlikely to be high enough
to compensate lenders for risk of failure in technology-based start-ups.  Colombo & Grilli,
supra note 101, at 4.
131. Carpenter and Petersen, supra note 126 at F58; see also Colombo & Grilli, supra
note 101, at 4.  However, Berger and Udell’s work establishing the informational benefits to
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cally indeterminate, and are predicated far less on asset value than on fu-
ture cash flow.  Besides, even assuming the existence of valuable
intellectual property, the increased chances of foreclosure present the like-
lihood of putting the putative lender into the business of locating venture
financing, whether directly or by sale of the asset, effectively turning the
lender into an entrepreneur and bringing us back to the beginning of the
problem.132
If debt is an unlikely instrument with which to finance entrepreneurs
who lack capital, it does appear that equity may be necessary.133 There is
evidence that small to medium U.S. high-tech firms use little debt, and
that equity capital obtained through the firm’s initial public offering is im-
portant in funding extensive firm growth.  (At the same time, once public,
most firms finance internally and rarely go back to public equity mar-
kets.)134  But other scholars note the surprising amount of debt raised by
start-up companies.135 While the evidence is mixed, it would appear that
the public equity market has performed an important function in stimulat-
ing new business growth and innovation, at least in the United States.136
C. Venture Capital and Exit as the Key to Capital Formation
Although venture capital has not received as much attention as other
forms of finance in the scholarly literature, it is clear that, in the United
States, venture investments are concentrated in high technology and other
banks (and firms) in relationship lending suggests that it is at least possible to conceive of a
new business that establishes an early relationship with a bank seeing its cost of borrowing
decline over time.  Berger & Udell, Small Business Credit Availability, supra note 99, at F38.
132. Colombo and Grilli conclude their examination of financing constraints on high-
tech startups in bank-based countries (specifically Italy but they generalize their conclusions)
by arguing for policies that stimulate an efficient venture capital industry as an important
means of providing liquidity for new concerns.  Accepting both their analysis and conclusions
leads back to the argument that external private equity is important in financing innovation
and thus returns us to the question of the kinds of exit needed to stimulate the growth of that
industry.  Colombo & Grilli, supra note 101, at 41.
133. Carpenter and Petersen, supra note 126, at F59, F60.UC
134. Carpenter & Petersen, supra note 126, at F68.
135. Berger and Udell are careful to distinguish between types of start-up companies,
noting that private external equity capital is far more common in riskier, and thus more likely
more profitable, ventures. Typically institutional lenders come in later than lenders who have
a relationship with the business’s founders. Berger & Udell, The Economics of Small Busi-
ness Finance, supra note 25, at 622.
136. Baumol, Litan, and Schramm define the entrepreneur as one who develops a new
product or service or finds new ways to deliver existing products and services, tying innova-
tion to the activity, rather than the size or stage of development of a business. See generally
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ROBERT E. LITAN, & CARL J. SCHRAMM, GOOD CAPITALISM, BAD
CAPITALISM, AND THE ECONOMICS OF GROWTH AND PROSPERITY [pincite] (2007). They
give pride of place to entrepreneurial capitalism in their explanation of the ways in which
certain kinds of capitalisms sustain economic growth and job creation in contrast to those
that perform less well.  While this broader topic of entrepreneurialism and growth is beyond
the scope of this paper, what I argue here suggests that its macroeconomic importance should
stimulate greater study by legal scholars.
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especially risky ventures.  While these form only a very small proportion
of new business ventures,137 it is these corporations, when they succeed,
that seem to make the most substantial contribution to economic growth.
Data published by the National Venture Capital Association show that
21% of 2008 U.S. GDP was generated by venture capital-backed compa-
nies.  Job growth in venture-backed companies also has been significantly
greater than that in the entire private sector.138 This observation should
not be surprising in light of the fact that an active venture capital market
has existed in the United States only for the last 35 years139 and it would
therefore stand to reason that a large proportion of successful venture-
backed companies remain in a stage of rapid growth.  But despite histori-
cal qualifications it is nonetheless clear that venture capital has been im-
portant to stimulating a significant amount of GDP and job growth.140
137. Berger & Udell, The Economics of Small Business Finance, supra note 25, at 623
(pointing out the venture funding tends to come at a relatively late stage of business develop-
ment after internal capital has been used to establish a product).
138. THE NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION & IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, VEN-
TURE IMPACT: THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF VENTURE CAPITAL-BACKED COMPANIES TO
THE U.S. ECONOMY (5th ed., 2009) [hereinafter, THE NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCI-
ATION, Venture Impact].
139. Kortum & Lerner, supra note 25, at 676.
140. See also Leslie A. Jeng & Philippe C. Wells, The Determinants of Venture Capital
Funding: Evidence Across Countries, 6 J. CORP. FIN. 241, 245 (2000) (emphasizing the impor-
tance of venture capital in terms of the rates of venture-backed firm growth (although not
GDP growth) and job creation compared with non-venture backed companies).  Hellmann
and Puri show that innovator firms are more likely than imitator firms to attract venture
financing, and that venture financing is associated with faster product market delivery.  Inter-
estingly, they also show that for imitator companies, but not for innovators, venture capital is
associated with greater amounts of external financing, thereby suggesting that venture capi-
talists’ contributions to innovator firms are significantly greater than mere financing.  Thomas
Hellmann & Manju Puri, The Interaction Between Product Market and Financing Strategy:
The Role of Venture Capital, 13 REV. FIN. STUD. 959 (2000).  For a more casually empirical
study of the non-financial contributions of venture capitalists, see Vance H. Fried & Robert
D. Hirsch, The Venture Capitalist: A Relationship Investor, 37 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT
REV., at 101 (1995).
It is worth noting that almost every law review article on the subject of venture capital
(consisting of a relatively small body of literature) simply assumes its importance to the U.S.
economy without any data as to its real contribution to growth. See generally Darian M.
Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405 (2008);
Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 967 (2006); Elizabeth Cosenza, Co-invest at Your Own Risk: An Exploration
of Potential Remedial Theories for Breaches of Rights of First Refusal in the Venture Capital
Context, 55 AMERICAN U. L. REV. 87 (2005); Duke K. Bristow, Benjamin D. King, & Lee R.
Petillon, Venture Capital Formation and Access: Lingering Impediments of the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 2004 COL. BUS. L. REV. 77 (2004); George W. Dent, Jr., Venture
Capital and the Future of Corporate Finance, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 1029 (1992). But see gener-
ally Black & Gilson, supra note 88 (although technically not a law review article); Curtis J.
Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital and the
Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 865, 866 n.3 (1997) (noting
that claims for the importance of venture capital are underexplored).
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Despite the impressive recent contributions of venture capital backed
companies, it is worth noting that American industry had been enor-
mously successful for more than a century prior to the introduction of ven-
ture capital.  It would therefore be ahistorical and somewhat misleading to
suggest that recent industrial innovation, especially in the venture-heavy
technology and biotechnology industries, could only have been financed in
the presence of venture capital.  Nonetheless, I have promised to follow
the money, and it appears that $456 billion of venture capital had been
invested in 27,000 companies over the 38 years ending in 2009.141  The
venture capital business model and venture capital contracts are struc-
tured in a manner that gives us reasonable assurance that virtually all of
this money is actually invested in production or related expenses.  So, in
contrast to proxies for capital formation that dominate studies of the stock
market’s contribution to industrial growth, our ability to see the amount of
cash invested in venture-backed industries gives us a more realistic starting
point for analyzing the importance of public equity markets than exists in
the literature.
But again, this is not without question.  For what we don’t see, and for
which I have no source of data, is the amount of money withdrawn from
these companies by entrepreneurs and venture capitalists to parallel the
data on the net capital investment by the public equity market in Ameri-
can corporations.  There is good reason to believe that withdrawals are
negligible before the public offering stage.  Both entrepreneurs and ven-
ture capitalists are, after all, far more interested in maximizing returns
from exit than current income during development.  Entrepreneurs typi-
cally draw relatively low salaries; venture capitalists typically purchase
convertible preferred stock, with modest discretionary dividends that are
easily passed by the board,142 or convertible debt with modest fixed inter-
est payments.143  Even so, venture capitalists look for their returns on exit,
not during their investment period.  Based on this data, I will proceed on
the inference that venture capital has recently become an important stimu-
lus to real economic growth.
This leads to the vitally important question of the motivations of inves-
tors and venture capitalists in making their investments.  The clear answer
is, of course, the expected higher returns from venture investments than
from, say, public equity investments.144  These returns are, of course, real-
141. THE NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION, Venture Impact, supra note 138,
at 9.
142. Franklin Allen & Wei-ling Song, Venture Capital and Corporate Governance, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND MMMMCAPITAL FLOWS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 133-156
(Peter K. Cornelius and Bruce Kogut, eds., 2003).
143. Black & Gilson, supra note 88, at 246, 260 (recognizing that exit, at least through
an IPO, allows the entrepreneur to recapture control of the company from the venture capi-
talists by selling only a portion, if any, of his stock while the venture capitalists effect a com-
plete exit).
144. George W. Fenn & Nellie Liang, New Resources and New Ideas: Private Equity for
Small Business, 22 J. BANKING & FIN. 1077, 1080 (1998) (noting that one major data provider
190 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 6:155
ized upon exit.  For venture capitalists, this exit may either occur (i)
through public markets, or (ii) through strategic merger.  Next, I will con-
sider the relative importance and success of these two types of exits, and
evaluate the necessity of public markets to the continued existence of ven-
ture capital.
1. Exit Through Public Markets
The predominant, although not exclusive, means of venture exit is
through IPOs.  I have been arguing, however, that the public equity mar-
ket, which is the traditional avenue through which venture capitalists exit
and reap the returns for which they have invested,145 may not be as impor-
tant for capital formation as is generally believed to be the case.  The ques-
tion then arises as to whether this conclusion holds for venture capital
backed companies and whether venture capitalists can be induced to per-
form their important role in the absence of a public equity market.
Just how important is the IPO to venture capitalists as an exit option?
Black and Gilson, in a comparison of U.S. and German venture capital,
argue that it is quite important and that it also provides the most efficient
form of exit.146  Jeng and Wells, using a cross-country analysis of 21 coun-
tries, find that IPOs are the strongest factor in determining the level of
later stage venture capital investing.147  Despite the very real merits of
these studies, it should be noted that they were written when significant
venture funding had been a factor in American industry for only 20 years,
using as data sources smaller subsets of this period.148
Accepting their conclusions still leaves the following question: for
whom is efficiency important?  Growth depends not only upon the crea-
tion of new businesses but upon their long-term survival as well.  Cressy
has demonstrated, using a large sample-set of U.K. start-ups, that human
capital is the single best predictor of firm survival in businesses heavily
dependent upon such human capital.149  Clearly human capital is vitally
important to the types of companies venture capitalists tend to finance.
showed that returns to venture partnership funds, while very high in the early years of ven-
ture capital were, from about 1980 through 1995, “quite ordinary.”).
145. Berger & Udell, The Economics of Small Business Finance, supra note 25, at 634.
146. Black & Gilson, supra note 88, at 274;
147. Jeng & Wells, supra note 140 (testing “gross domestic product . . . and market
capitalization growth, financial reporting standards, labor market rigidities, financial report-
ing standards, private pension funds, and government programs” as factors in the level of
venture capital financing in addition to the availability of IPOs). See also, Black & Gilson,
supra note 88, at 274; Douglas Cumming, Grant Fleming, & Armin Schweinbacher, Liquidity
Risk and Venture Capital Finance, 34 FIN. MGMT., at 77 (Winter 2005).
148. See generally Black & Gilson, supra note 88, at (relying on data from 1978 to
1996); Jeng & Wells, supra note 140 (studying the period from 1986 to 1995).
149. Robert Cressy, Are Business Startups Debt-Rationed? 106 THE ECON. J. 1253
(1996) (discussing that it is logical to conclude that human capital is the best predictor of
survival for equity-financed start-ups and “that the correlation between financial capital and
survival is spurious.”); see also, Luigi Zingales, In Search of New Foundations, 55 J. FIN. 1623,
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Among the variety of services performed by venture capitalists, manage-
rial assistance is one of the most significant.  If we were to find that IPOs
permit venture capitalists to exit at a premature stage of a business’s man-
agerial or economic development, we might agree that IPOs enhance effi-
cient contracting between venture capitalist and entrepreneur, as Black
and Gilson contend, but we might also conclude that such exit was not
ideal in terms of long-term economic growth.  If so, and if we chose to
encourage exit that might be less micro-economically efficient as, for ex-
ample, through strategic mergers, we would still have to address the con-
tracting problem they examine.  But we might be willing to incur some
level of micro-inefficiency in exchange for ensuring that only more well-
developed and better-managed companies entered the public market.  It
might be that exit through strategic merger results in higher contributions
of venture-backed enterprises to GDP than IPO-backed exits.150
Jeng and Wells report that in 1988, exit through IPOs returned an aver-
age 195% over 4.2 years compared with strategic acquisitions which re-
turned 40% over 3.7 years.151  While this is an interesting fact, it says
nothing about why the rate of return was so much higher in the IPO con-
text.152  It may be that the return captured by the exiting venture capital-
ists was less a function of profitability (and thus relevant to GDP) than it
was to market factors.
Distortions created by market inefficiencies, including asymmetric in-
formation or market timing by exiting venture capitalists, could produce
artificially high returns from IPOs such that strategic mergers, in which a
single buyer more closely assesses the corporation’s prospects without
public market effects, produce more realistic valuations.  IPOs tend to oc-
cur in robust markets in which the sellers can obtain high multiples of
earnings.  In fact the market was extremely active in Jeng and Wells’ sam-
ple year of 1988, with a turnover ratio on the New York Stock Exchange of
55%, a ratio that, while not an all-time high, was, at its time, extremely
high from an historical perspective.153  Interestingly, it also appears that
IPOs took a sharp dip that year from a much higher number of IPOs in
1987, suggesting perhaps that pent-up demand for new issues pushed
1640-43 (2000) (discussing the important of human capital to new, equity-based, businesses
during the 1990s).
150. The answer is, naturally, a matter of empirical investigation, which I do not here
undertake.
151. Jeng & Wells, supra note 140, at 254.
152. But see James C. Brau, Bill Francis, & Ninon Kohers, The Choice of IPO versus
Takeover: Empirical Evidence, 76 J. BUS. 583, 586 (2003) (finding that a more comprehensive
study found that the difference between IPO premia and takeover premia to insiders like
venture capitalists was 22%, a discount that the authors conclude that insiders are willing to
take in exchange for the complete liquidation of their positions allowed by the acquisition in
contrast to the IPO)
153. While IPOs generally don’t list on the NYSE, the statistic is some indication of
market activity.
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prices higher in a particularly speculative environment.154  This insight is
supported by a study performed by Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales.  Noting
a paucity of data with which to analyze the question of why firms go pub-
lic, they develop a substantial data set from Italy.155  Simply put, they find
that the greatest single factor in the decision to go public is the market-to-
book ratio in the company’s industry, and that “investment and profitabil-
ity decrease after the IPO,” suggesting that the availability of high multi-
ples of earnings attracts the decision to exit.156  While their study is
necessarily limited by the available data, their identification of managerial
motivations is consistent with the theory I have articulated.  And, while
nationally limited, they argue that their results can be extrapolated.157
There is, on the other hand, a significant literature on IPO underpric-
ing, only some of which is related to venture capital-backed offerings.  Jay
Ritter has evaluated claims of IPO underpricing and concluded that while
such underpricing can occur in the short-run, over the long-run IPOs tend
to be poor investments, underperforming the market, thus suggesting in-
vestor over-optimism and opportunistic timing by issuers.158  In a recent
paper, Ritter refined his conclusions by studying the IPO market in the
1990s and, particularly, during the internet bubble of 1999 to 2000, con-
cluding that during this period substantial IPO underpricing was observed
because (i) issuers placed a higher premium on obtaining top analyst cov-
erage (associated with a small number of underwriters) than on maximiz-
ing IPO value, and (ii) that side payments to managers of IPO companies
and potential IPO companies in the form of preferential IPO allocations
(a practice known as “spinning”) shifted issuers’ managerial incentives
from maximizing IPO returns to maximizing their own personal wealth.159
154. A possible factor in the diminished number of IPOs is the market crash on Black
Monday, October 19, 1987, although the market rapidly recovered thereafter.
155. See generally Pagano et al., supra note 60.
156. Id. (discussing diversification and that entrepreneurs tend not to sell out substan-
tially in the IPO but supernormal turnover in the control group happens within three years
following the IPO). See also, Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton, & Jean Tirole, Exit Options in
Corporate Finance: Liquidity Versus Incentives, 8 REV. FIN. 327, 346 (2004); see generally
Douglas Cumming & Jerry McIntosh, Boom, Bust, and Litigation in Venture Capital Financ-
ing, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 867 (2004) (discussing cyclicality of IPO market and venture
financing); Douglas Cumming & Jerry McIntosh, Venture-Capital Exits in Canada and the
United States, 53 TORONTO L. J., at 101 (2003)(discussing exit more broadly); Joshua Lerner,
“Angel” Financing and Public Policy: An Overview, 22 J. BANKING AND FIN. 773, 776 (1998)
(noting studies that demonstrate public offerings tend to occur when stock is overvalued and
those that demonstrate that stock prices typically decline upon the announcement of equity
issuances by public companies); Michelle Lowry, Why Does IPO Volume Fluctuate So Much?
67 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2003) (discussing the role of investor sentiment in the U.S. IPO market).
157. Other, somewhat older, studies suggest that venture-backed IPOs outperform non-
venture backed IPOs, and are less systematically underpriced than non-venture IPOs. See
generally Berger & Udell, The Economics of Small Business Finance, supra note 25, at 634.
158. Jay R. Ritter, The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN., at
3 (1991); Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, The New Issues Puzzle, 50 J. FIN., at 23 (1995).
159. Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?
33 FIN. MANAGEMENT, at 5 (2004).
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The period-specific nature of this analysis demonstrates, so Ritter argues,
that the pricing of IPOs can depend very much on circumstances external
to the various measurements of issuer value, and supports his idea of the
cyclicality of IPO pricing.  Interestingly, Loughran and Ritter document a
shift over time in firms going public toward firms with negative earn-
ings.160 This last observation should at least counsel caution in assessing
the long-run real economic contributions of companies that go public.
Ritter’s work has been challenged, in particular in connection with
venture capital IPOs.161  Brav and Gompers replicate and modify Ritter’s
work by, in part, more closely examining the types of companies going
public.  They find that venture-backed IPOs substantially outperform the
market over a five year period and that at least some of Ritter’s conclu-
sions can be explained by the presence of “small, non-venture backed
IPOs,” the returns (and other performance metrics) on which are signifi-
cantly below venture-backed IPOs.  This underperformance, they con-
clude, can be explained at least in part by the behavior of market investors
who are more likely to be the purchasers of these types of IPOs and who
are more prone to emotional behavior than are the institutions that tend
to buy the larger, venture-backed, IPOs.162  They also find that the un-
derperformance shown by Loughran and Ritter appears to carry through
to non-public companies with similar characteristics, thus suggesting that it
is the nature of the company more than its private or public status that
primarily accounts for performance.
Gompers and Josh Lerner extend their research back into an historical
period that preceded the creation of NASDAQ and the venture capital
industry itself.  Studying stock prices and performance from 1935 to 1972
creates, they argue, substantial doubt over whether IPOs underperform,
and shows that overall IPOs match market returns.163  On the one hand,
this makes perfect sense given the number of public offerings that oc-
curred during that period because the number and diversity of offerings
almost certainly presents sufficient diversification to mimic the market,
even though a substantial number of leading corporations had become
public prior to that time.  (It is worth noting that the components of the
Dow Jones Industrial Average in 1935 and 1972 were substantially the
same and largely included companies formed prior to or shortly following
the turn of the century.)  Moreover, this is a period for which substantial
retained earnings were held by American corporations, earnings which
160. Id.
161. Alon Brav & Paul A. Gompers, Myth or Reality? The Long-Run Un-
derperformance of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture and Nonventure Capital
–Backed Companies, 52 J. FIN. 1791 (1997); Paul A. Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Really
Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings: The Pre-Nasdaq Evidence, 58 J. FIN., at
1355 (2003) [hereinafter, Gompers & Lerner, The Really Long-Run Performance].
162. See also, William L. Megginson & Kathleen A. Weiss, Venture Capitalist Certifica-
tion in Initial Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN., at 879 (1991) (showing that institutional holdings of
venture-backed IPO stocks is greater than non-venture backed IPO stocks).
163. Gompers & Lerner, The Really Long-Run Performance, supra note 161.
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likely had some effect in supporting stock prices, unlike the average of
corporations in the period from the 1980s on that typically provides data
from these studies, in which retained earnings rapidly were disappear-
ing.164  In any event, the issue continues to be a subject of active debate,
and leaves the desirability of the IPO exit option inconclusive.
Overpricing and underpricing IPOs both can have negative repercus-
sions.  Overpricing results in the inefficient allocation of capital if investors
become sufficiently disenchanted by the post-IPO underperformance of
the market that IPO returns become disappointing, leading venture capi-
talists to underinvest.  It also has the potential to leave management with
long-term unsustainably high stock prices, which they might attempt to
maintain by short-run measures that damage long run performance.165
Underpricing transfers money from the corporation to secondary buyers
as well as to entrepreneurs and venture capitalists who typically retain sig-
nificant portions of their shares after the IPO, thus perhaps leaving the
newly-public company without adequate resources or with the need to ob-
tain additional external financing in the future.166  In neither case is the
corporation well served in terms of its long-run managerial and financing
goals, and thus productivity and long-term economic growth could
suffer.167
2. Exit Through Strategic Merger
Despite the academic interest in venture-backed IPOs, acquisitions as
an exit mechanism significantly exceeded IPOs in every year from 1998 to
2008, including the bubble years of 1999 and 2000.168  Strategic buyers are
unlikely systematically to misprice a company.169  In the first place, strate-
164. Mitchell, Legitimate Rights, supra note 34, at 1655 Fig. 1.
165. See, e.g. Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal, supra note 21.
166. Silvia Rossetto argues that when venture capitalists are eager to exit existing in-
vestments in order to obtain capital to invest in higher return opportunities during a hot IPO
market, they are more willing to underprice IPOs. See generally, Silvia Rossetto, The Price of
Rapid Exit in Venture Capital-Backed IPOs, (AFA 2006 Boston Meetings Paper, 2006) http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=686704.  Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole, addressing
the question of optimal contract design for monitoring venture capital deals, argue that the
optimal contract for a venture capitalist (more broadly, in their terms, an “active monitor,”
should be more liquid when flows of funds into the venture capital industry are high, leading
to lower demanded returns thus reducing the cost of a more efficiently liquid contract.
Aghion, et al., supra note 156, at 350.
167. Bebchuk and Zingales argue that the effects by a business owner of the initial
choice of ownership structure leads toward a distortion of the socially optimal structure in
favor of excessive IPOs. See generally, Lucian A. Bebchuk & Luigi Zingales, Corporate
Ownership Structures: Private Versus Social Optimality (Harvard Law School Center for Law
and Economics, Working Paper 181) (published as Ownership Structures and the Decision to
Go Public, Concentrated Corporate Ownership (2000)) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=10072.
168. WILMERHALE, VENTURE CAPITAL REPORT 4-5 (2008).
169. Oddly, Jeng and Wells give data on exit by strategic merger versus IPO for every
country in their study but the United States. Jeng & Wells, supra note 140.
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gic buyers are unlikely to be subject to the distorting incentives that entre-
preneurs, managers, venture capitalists, and investment bankers may
suffer.  Moreover, such purchases rely neither on the presence of an effi-
cient market nor are likely to be distorted by market trends or noise trad-
ing.  Rather, strategic buyers engage in the kind of due diligence and
valuation methods suited to their own business needs, and are unlikely to
make offers for companies that neither fit with their own long-term busi-
ness plans nor needs for growth.170  Thus strategic buyers are more likely
to get it right than the market as a whole, suggesting that strategic acquisi-
tions might be more beneficial from a macroeconomic standpoint than
IPOs in terms of broader economic growth.
History again suggests that exit through an IPO may not be optimal
from a productivity and growth perspective.171  A significant problem dur-
ing the merger wave that formed the modern stock market was that trust
promoters and investment bankers both exited and provided liquidity for
industrialists before the combinations they created had adequate perform-
ance histories to justify the multiples (then called capitalizations) at which
the securities were sold.  One result of this behavior was a significant stock
market crash in 1903, diminishing stock prices by approximately $1.8 bil-
lion in 1903 dollars, leaving the combinations’ creators with substantial
cash and public buyers with unsustainable (and evidently unsustained)
stock prices.172  At least as significant, the 1920s, which was a decade of
major innovation, saw a substantial number of highly priced IPOs from
companies that had little operating history and ceased to exist after the
1929 Crash.173  The dot.com bubble of the late 1990s also provides an ex-
ample of a period in which a number of untested companies went public at
170. James C. Brau, Bill Francis, & Ninon Kohers, The Choice of IPO Versus Takeover:
Empirical Evidence, 76 J. BUS., at 583, 585 (2003) (noting that strategic buyers are less likely
to face information asymmetries regarding the target’s value than IPO buyers).
171. I do not mean to suggest that what was true in a very different economy can be
completely extrapolated to modern circumstances, only to observe that historical sensitivity
might lead to the conclusion that claims for the importance of venture capital might be
overstated.
172. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY, supra note 16, at 95.
173. For data on the average age of companies that made IPOs during the 1920s, see
Boyan Jovanovic, & Peter L. Rousseau, Why Wait? A Century of Life Before IPO, 91 AM.
ECON. REV. 336, 337 (2001)  (describing how the average age of firms going public was rising
during the 1920s, but was still younger than in subsequent decades). Thomas Phillippon ar-
gues that the 1920s were a time of “rapid entry and investment by firms with large financial
needs” including the electric industry, automobile, and pharmaceutical companies.  Thomas
Philliponn, The Evolution of the U.S. Financial Industry from 1860 to 2007: Theory and Evi-
dence, 6, 24 (Nov. 2008) http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~tphillip/papers/finsize/pdf. See also,
Boyan Jovanovic & Peter L. Rousseau, Two Technological Revolutions, 1 J. EURO. ECON.
ASSOCIATION, at 419 (2003) (noting that the electric and internal combustion sectors led the
way for a wave of IPOs in the 1920s.) Many of the companies that went public during that era
did, however, survive, prosper, and remain with us in some form today.
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high multiples,174 only to collapse when the bubble burst in 2000.175
While in each of these cases, fallen stock price did not necessarily mean
corporate death (and indeed a number of fallen companies went on to
prosper), it does suggest that the greater availability of IPOs during peri-
ods of significant industrial innovation creates incentives for venture capi-
talists to exit long before sound business logic would suggest is prudent.
The 2008 financial collapse provides a laboratory in which to examine
the question, at least short-term.  The second quarter of 2008 saw a com-
plete absence of IPOs, the first time that had happened since 1978.  At the
same time, while strategic acquisitions of venture-backed companies were
down, they nevertheless continued.  A subsequent study suggests that,
even after recovery, venture capital funding and exit may be changed for
the long-term in that corporate life-cycles may lengthen, with venture capi-
talists extending the growth and maturity of their investments before
bringing them public, thus incurring more intermediate investment costs
during the corporations’ development.  As a result, exits may become less
lucrative and strategic acquisitions could become a more important exit
mechanism.176 Indeed, some evidence suggests that this was precisely the
case.  In 2009, there were 262 acquisitions of venture-backed companies in
contrast to only 13 IPOs.177 While economic conditions were probably
unattractive for IPOs in light of the ongoing financial crisis, it is also well
known that financing was hard to obtain, a circumstance that could also
have limited the number of acquisitions.  This information is consistent
with the possibility that exit strategies for venture capitalists may be
changing.
Encouraging exit through strategic merger might be a better alterna-
tive than IPOs for ensuring long-term corporate productivity and growth.
When entrepreneurs and early investors exit a firm through a public offer-
ing, they sell the stock at a multiple of earnings ideally designed to capture
future cash flows produced by the business.  Whether or not they get it
right is heavily dependent upon experience, judgment, and market condi-
tions, and indeed the late 1990s provide an excellent example of a market
environment in which IPOs either may have been systematically under-
priced or highly overvalued by the market immediately following the of-
174. See Eugene Choo, Going Dutch: The Google IPO, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 405,
408-10 (2005); Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. 711, 712 (2005). See also, Joseph L. Lemon, Jr., Don’t Let Me Down (Round): Avoid-
ing Illusory Terms in Venture Capital Financing in the Post Internet Bubble Era, 39 TEXAS J.
BUS. L. 1, 3 (2003).
175. Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior, & Venture Survival: A
Theory of Venture-Capital Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 49.
176. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE EXIT SLOWDOWN AND THE NEW VENTURE
CAPITAL LANDSCAPE: FINDINGS FROM THE MONEYTREE REPORT (2008).
177. NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION, VENTURE-BACKED EXIT MARKET
IMPROVES MARGINALLY AT YEAR END (January 4, 2010) http://bx.businessweek.com/zappos
/view?urlhttp%3A%2F%2Fc.moreover.com%2Fclick%2Fhere.pl%3Fr2441771128%26f
%3D9791.
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fering.178  The important point, as I noted in Section 3.1, is that external
buyers of the stock do not expect to realize these cash flows through im-
proved management of the business.  Rather, as the shift from investing
for the expectation of dividends to trading for capital gains suggests, they
anticipate their profits from their ability to sell the stock, regardless of
whether the increased selling price is a function of good management,
market sentiment, or stock price manipulation.
In contrast, strategic merger partners must assume that the only way
that they will realize their expected return on investment is if they manage
companies or use their innovations better than they had been managed or
used under the entrepreneur and venture capitalists.  Otherwise, they
would have no way of generating the cash flows needed to compensate
them not only for the cost of acquisition, but also to generate profits above
that cost.  While there are many ways to generate higher short-term earn-
ings that can damage the business in the long run, the incentives of strate-
gic buyers make mutilation an irrational management strategy from any
perspective.  It makes sense, then, to think that a firm that is sold in its
entirety to a strategic buyer will, ceteris paribus, be better managed than a
firm that is transferred to broad public ownership through an IPO.  This
should be true even if, as is often the case, the entrepreneur maintains a
substantial stake in the company, because the IPO inevitably subjects him
to market pressures in managing the company, which may divert his incen-
tives away from real economic growth.
I think that at least the parameters of the argument are clear.  Most
important is that we need to understand the impact of venture capital exits
on GDP growth and job creation, not simply in terms of return to inves-
tors.  While the latter is important data, it is not enough to sustain the
argument that, as a matter of legal policy, our paradigmatic exit mode
should be through IPOs.  It may be that such a conclusion should be sus-
tained.  But not without significantly more empirical research, beginning
with a healthy scholarly skepticism that largely has been absent.
D. Moving Forward
I have spent time discussing the relationship between the public equity
market and venture capital, but would be remiss in failing to discuss the
role the former plays in more historically traditional exit.  The record is
clear that public equity markets have long provided exit for entrepreneurs
and their heirs.  But the historical role the market has played has been
somewhat different.  Rather than ensuring high returns, it has provided a
way for entrepreneurs to diversify their investments by monetizing and
reinvesting portions of them and, perhaps more important, has given the
second and third generations a way of creating incentives for professional
managers to replace untalented or uninterested heirs.  Each of these rea-
178. See generally Ritter, supra note 158 (arguing that underpricing is a short-term phe-
nomenon); see generally Brav & Gompers, supra note 161 (finding that venture-backed IPOs
outperform non-venture-backed IPOs).
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sons has a relationship to GDP growth, the former by providing invest-
ment or consumption capital, and the latter by ensuring business growth
and stability.
I have already discussed this at some length in Part 3.7.  Recall that
Navin and Sears, in their still-influential paper, argue the reverse causality
of finance and growth, that is, that the development of finance as an exit
mechanism followed upon the substantial growth of nineteenth century
corporations.  Moreover, as I there noted, exit was not of special concern
to the great nineteenth century industrialists; current returns on their in-
vestments were more than sufficient to satisfy the desires of Carnegie and
Rockefeller, including extraordinarily generous amounts for philanthropic
purposes.  And that list could be repeated at length.  Finally, I there dis-
cussed the different sorts of managerial incentives that motivate one who
continues to own a business and one who forms it with the expectation of
selling.
It is important to note that the business goals of those earlier capitalists
are not gone.  As the venture capital literature notes, entrepreneurs often
use the IPO as a means of recapturing control from the venture capitalists,
even if liquidating some portion of their investments at the venture exit
stage.  And entrepreneurs do remain in control of some of the most visibly
successful of venture-backed companies.  Would they have engaged in en-
trepreneurship if the high-multiple IPO exit option were unavailable?
This, of course, is an unanswerable question.  But the nineteenth century
model of innovative entrepreneur, when the IPO exit option was effec-
tively unavailable, provides a nice suggestion that the need to capitalize
eternity was not a driving force behind their creations.  Even the partial
exits achieved during the Great Merger Wave that led to the formation of
the modern stock market were far less motivated by desires for exit than
they were for business purposes and the opportunism of investment bank-
ers.179  The introduction of federal income tax law in 1916 was certainly a
spur to significant exit.  But taxation remains a highly effective means of
shaping industries and markets, and achieving macroeconomic policy
goals.  So one cannot take any particular set of tax incentives as a given
without considering the policy objectives to be achieved.  In any event,
history at least raises a question of the overall importance of this form of
entrepreneurial exit, and the macroeconomic inquiry I have been pursuing
here requires us again to ask whether the market infrastructures we’ve
created, complete with all of their attendant costs and effects upon mana-
gerial and investor behavior, are justified in terms of economic growth
light of the immaterially small percentage of annual trading that relies
upon entrepreneurial exit.
More immediately, an important and, perhaps, problematic aspect of
the strategic merger solution is that the entrepreneur often loses control of
the business to the acquirer.  This deprives her of the intangible benefits
179. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY, supra note 16, at 1-29.
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personal to the entrepreneur of remaining in control of the business and
ideally helping it to grow.  Whether or not this would act as a disincentive
to innovation and business creation is not clear, and is a question that
requires further study.  Another disadvantage from the entrepreneurial
standpoint is the lost opportunity to build future wealth from increases in
the corporation’s stock price.  This may or may not provide a disincentive
to innovate, since presumably the entrepreneur will not agree to sell the
business unless she is happy with the acquisition price.  More important,
and more relevant to the point of this paper, is the question I have already
discussed of whether IPO exit is best from the standpoint of economic
growth and job creation.  As I have noted, that is not a question I can
answer within the parameters of this piece, but at a minimum the answer
to that macroeconomic question must be weighed and balanced with the
microeconomic question of entrepreneurial incentives rather than simply
disregarded.
V. CONCLUSION
While the case for the public stock market in terms of productive capi-
tal formation is dubious as a general proposition, there is a more special-
ized case to be made for the importance of the stock market in stimulating
innovation in the form of venture capital –backed new business creation.
Yet venture financing covers only a small portion of U.S. industrial his-
tory, and claims about its significance demand qualification, or at least
substantial contextualization.  Even if we accept the case for venture capi-
tal as a stimulant for GDP growth and the microeconomic arguments for
IPO exit as a necessary stimulant to venture capital investment, we cannot
conclude that the IPO market provides the best form of exit from a
macroeconomic perspective or that capital would not be invested in its
absence.  I have raised significant questions about the sources of IPO re-
turns, the state of development of companies taken public in contrast to
those sold in strategic mergers, and the managerial maturity of such com-
panies These all go to the ultimate question of the comparative merits of
the public market versus private sales in terms of GDP growth and job
growth.  These questions tie directly into the structure and substance of
legal regulation.
All of this raises serious questions that deserve further exploration as
to the talent, time, and resources we devote to the public equity market,
both from a legal and an economic incentive.  One might theorize – al-
though it is beyond the scope of this paper to do so at length – that the
answer is the entrenched financial interests of investment banks and other
financial intermediaries and investors who maintain the market for their
own benefit regardless of broader economic consequences.  In light of the
potentially damaging effects of the market, and especially in light of the
role the public equity market has played in dramatically increasing eco-
nomic inequality, it is time to dig deeper into the question of the relation-
ship between the public equity market and economic growth.
